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## Near East/South Asia Report

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15 October 1984

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## RESPONSE TO MOROCCAN-LIBYAN TREATY CALLED EXAGGERATED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 18, 5 Sep 84 pp 1-3

[Text]

The treaty of unity signed between King **Hassan** and Col. **Gadaffi** at Oudja on 13 August has received an exaggerated international response. The **Moroccan-Libyan** honeymoon started in June last year for tactical reasons. Gadaffi and Hassan were isolated in Maghrebian affairs; both were under pressure at home - and still are - and both are waging unsatisfactory battles, Gadaffi in **Chad** and Hassan in **Western Sahara**.

Apart from Western Sahara, and its unending drain on Moroccan finance and morale (AC Vol 25 Nos 11 & 12), Hassan's immediate incentives for signing on with Gadaffi were fourfold:

- Morocco has explosively high unemployment. About 16,000 Moroccans already work in Libya. A 'unity' agreement could mean thousands more jobs there.
- Gadaffi offered Hassan cheap oil - an offer often made but not always fulfilled.
- **Saudi Arabia**, one of Hassan's closest allies, encouraged him to go along with Gadaffi.
- The radio-waves war between Rabat and Tripoli, in which Libya constantly denounced Hassan as an anti-Arab puppet of Zionists and **Americans**, was beginning to strike chords among Morocco's disgruntled poor.

As for Gadaffi, none of his numerous acts of union has ever worked. Since he came to power in 1969 he has declared full-fledged unions at least six times. He does have a strangely abiding link made with **Syria** in 1980. But there is little depth to it. Syrian president, **Hafez al Assad** merely wants to keep Gadaffi in the nominally radical camp in the Arab world and out of an alliance with any rival, notably **Egypt**. Assad is unhappy with Gadaffi's new link with conservative Hassan, who has been a staunch supporter of the Camp David peace process. At the end of last month Assad went to Benghazi to convey this message personally before going to see **Algerian** president **Chadli Benjedid** in Algiers.

Gadaffi's pan-Arab vision never got far; he has largely failed to impress the Libyan people with his ideas, least of all his practices; and he is increasingly paranoid about his security (See on page 3 post-

mortem report on the attempted coup in May). In his effort to make friends he will probably turn appreciably to the West. He might pull out of Chad (see page 2). But the agreement with Morocco will not by itself be of much consequence.

Gadaffi's regional courtship began in 1982, a year in which Libya's oil revenue dropped by about \$12 billion to \$8 billion. Pan-Arab platitudes were not enough. Libya needed markets, finance, manpower and friends. All were in short-supply. Tunisia seemed a good place to start a process of reconciliation within the Maghreb.

In 1980 Libya and Tunisia were hardly on speaking terms following alleged Libyan involvement in an attack on the southern Tunisian mining town of Gafsa. However by January 1982 Gadaffi and his opposite number, **Habib Bourguiba**, had agreed to bury their differences and harmonise their domestic and foreign policies, even to the point of cooperating on defence. They also set up a joint investment bank, capitalised at \$146m and geared to financing agricultural and other projects in both countries.

However, the proposed military pact (improbable, in practice, considering Tunisia's close defence links with the United States and Libya's with the **Soviet Union**) caused other countries in the Maghreb, particularly Algeria, to take notice. Theoretically Algeria had entered a unity pact with Libya, **Mauritania** and Chad in 1981. But its relations with Tripoli were already strained, chiefly because, with justification, it saw its own brand of socialism as a far more viable alternative for Africa than Gadaffi's heady, erratic radicalism. Also Libya was threatening to usurp its role as a supporter of Polisario in Western Sahara.

Algeria consequently set about putting a halt to any rapprochement between Libya and Tunisia. Algerian envoys had little difficulty in persuading Bourguiba that his union with Libya was unviable. The momentum towards rapprochement with Libya in Tunisia came from leftist-leaning politicians who looked to Gadaffi's support in the leadership battle which would inevitably follow Bourguiba's death. But the elderly president, newly buoyed with American arms, had little need of such a compromise. Consequently in March 1983 a pact between Algeria and Tunisia was announced, to be joined in December by Mauritania.

Mauritania's involvement was unexpected, since Gadaffi himself, perturbed at Tunisia and Algeria's duplicity, had visited Nouakchott in July 1983, and talks on union between Libya and Mauritania were going ahead. But, as in other countries, the Mauritani-ans' fear of Libyan intentions in their country proved stronger than any genuine desire for friendship. Although Mauritanian President **Mohammed**



**Khouna Ould Haidalla** had recently set up the *Structures de l'Education des Masses* (SEM) - AC Vol 25 No 6 - which owed much to Gadaffi's Third Universal Theory, he is naturally conservative and was particularly incensed to hear of alleged Libyan (and later Moroccan) plans to topple him in early 1983. Also his prime minister (until March this year) Lt-Col. **Maouya Ould Sidahmed Taya** was a "progressiste" in the Algerian mould.

The Algeria-Tunisia-Mauritania pact caused Gadaffi to return to the offensive in Tunisia. Libya was duly implicated in the disturbances which rocked Tunisia in early 1984. Allegedly Libyan-backed Tunisians who supported anti-government riots at the start of 1984 were imprisoned. When a Libyan opposition group attempted to storm Gadaffi's Bab al-Aziziya barracks in Tripoli in May, the roles had been somewhat reversed: the opposition had entered Libya from Tunisia.

As the Tunisian-Algerian-Mauritanian pact took shape, Gadaffi began to look rather desperately to improving relations with the other main Maghreb country left out of it, Morocco. Hassan was quite happy to oblige. Indeed his enthusiasm for links with Libya clearly encouraged members of the tripartite pact, particularly Mauritania, to redouble their commitment to it.

Hassan's Libyan strategy was based on a number of perceptions - regional foreign policy, domestic politics and economic. Early in 1983 he was on the point of carrying out his role as one of the leaders of the 'moderates' in Afro-Arab affairs and sending troops to Chad to support **Hissein Habré** against incursions by the Libyan-backed **Goukounie Oued-dei**.

Sensing Gadaffi's need for both a respite in Chad and better relations with his neighbours, Hassan proposed he would not send his troops if Gadaffi withdrew his support from Polisario. Hassan might have preferred to draw closer to Mauritania. But a Moroccan-inspired attempt to topple President Haidalla earlier in the year had failed, and the latter was now firmly entrenched in the opposing camp - not least because Moroccan troops were pursuing Polisario guerrillas to the Mauritanian border and Nouakchott feared for the integrity of its borders.

Although Saudi Arabia has little time for Gadaffi, it is prepared to play along with him to a certain extent. Despite repeated attacks on the Saudi monarchy, Gadaffi actually required Saudi support and funding for his 'Great Man-made River' project (AC Vol 25 No 1), which he presented as a pan-Arab undertaking. He went to Saudi Arabia to plead for it in June 1983. King **Fahd** was happy to humour



him because he did not want Gadaffi to undermine (as he did in 1982) the new Middle East peace plan he is expected to unveil after the US presidential elections.

In the circumstances Libya was more than happy to respond to Morocco's overtures. Following Gadaffi's visit to Rabat in June 1983, high level contacts between Libya and Morocco were set in motion. In January a meeting was held to prepare a joint session of the General Peoples Congress and the Moroccan cabinet.

One consequence of the Libyan-Moroccan union is that it could help lessen tension between 'moderates' and 'radicals' in Africa. Ideological stances on the Western Sahara and Chad issues have practically paralysed the work of the OAU in the past three years. But it could also heighten a growing African feeling that Western Sahara and Chad are Arab issues to be resolved within an Arab rather than an African context, and this, in turn, could lead to a wider split between black and Arab Africa.

Morocco's main western allies, the US and France, hope that Hassan will have an influence over Gadaffi, rather than, in any respect, vice-versa. Last month the US announced plans for a \$50m refurbishment of the Sidi Slimane airfield, which will be used to improve the capability of the US rapid deployment force. France also wants to protect its West African interests. Gadaffi's successes there, though not necessarily long-lasting, show that the developing world's attraction to Gadaffi's 'third universal theory' should not be underestimated ●

CSO: 4500/3

## ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

BEIRUT DAILY RAPS U.S. POLICY ON ARMENIAN CAUSE

GF171920 Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 2 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Nor Or: "Is the Movement New?"]

[Text] We will not reveal something new when we say that money is more effective than justice or the various values that go with it. We made this statement to stress the accounts related with the political initiatives and interventions. If we are surprised today to hear the propaganda in favor of the Turks we must not forget that the machine under the disposition of a government operates only by considering the group that feeds it. We would not have liked to say that the authors of the articles in favor of the Turks are victims of such a sin when we consider that the media has no interest in this and loves justice, particularly in free America where the rights of the minorities are neglected to satisfy the majorities and because the minorities do not represent an effective political power.

One of the clowns of WASHINGTON TIMES, an author who loves the Turks, has poured all the rubbish in his mind into the newspaper to say that the Armenian genocide is a vision fabricated by the Armenians because in 1915 Turkey did not even exist. Thus how is it possible to demand an account from today's innocent Turks.

In this article which is full of funny remarks and comments, the typical Turkish spirit can be detected miles away. Yes, it comes from the garbage piles of rotten Ankara prisons and the newspaper which publishes it is not even concerned to reveal the truth because the given explanations and revelations coincide with the current policy adopted by the U.S. Government toward the Armenian tragedy and the public rage which are known by the White House visitors and hosts.

This is why the Armenian organizations are expressing their loud discontent to President Reagan and pointing out the wise statements made by his foreign affairs office. Thus the simple facts show that naturally the Washington-Ankara romance will never end as long as Reagan is fixed in his beliefs and accepts Turkey's usefulness in the NATO family even at the cost of hurting another ally, Greece, which has not been a contemptible friend within the Western camp. Why does this romance continue? What purpose will the change of party serve? We are not sure.

Yes, we are not convinced that the Democratic Party will change the country's political direction and stance and will look at the Turks through the facts of history. We saw Nixon, Ford (during Kissinger's kingdom), Carter, and now Reagan. And still the promises and suggestions of the Mondale-Ferraro election campaign. What valid proof will convince us that Mondale will not give in to the pressures and raise the "lunatic" flag of the Turks.

It is not the first time that such promises are made, particularly during the election campaign due to uncertainties.

It is also not the first time that the U.S. information networks, radio, television and press, makes disadvantageous statements about us. How is it possible to teach this group of ignorants when they are incapable of learning or do not have the minimum interest to become the spokesmen of justice. Or else such mistakes would not have been allowed and eccentric expressions would not have been made, either by the White House or reporters who are called soldiers to defend truth since the Turkish gold went into market. What can be done against the shining gold?

Display political power. This is what can be done as well as political interventions with a united voice, stance, and determination. Is it possible to make such a thing successful under the current conditions? Our experience tells us "no" because "cooperation" is a foreign and frightening word for the Armenian diaspora masses. The question does not have a relation with flags. It is related to self-devotion, love of truth, and practicality.

It is requested that President Reagan change his stance on the Armenian cause and make statements advantageous to the Armenians to rub the noses of the Turks in dirt. Similarly it is requested that the Armenians vote against Reagan and secure the success of the rival candidates. Is there anything surprising in this stance. Naturally only few will say "no" to it.

Turkey is still attacking and mocking France and making the question of "kneeling or not kneeling" an issue of international caricature. We are sure that the U.S. political leaders are following up with serious interest the anti-French feelings, propaganda and mockery developing in Ankara. Mockery against France and the Western world?

Where are we going to go with this course? Where are the governments that hold the political pivot of the world in their hands going? The leaders are not showing their harmonious spirit, awareness and seriousness. From whom will the small ones and minorities take their lessons in order to find a just solution for their causes? Where is the example and the outstanding ones?

Where is that "great" one that defends justice, love of mankind and freedom? Let it stand up with its deeds so that we will see, appreciate, and greet it.

We are still waiting for this opportunity.

CSO: 4605/11

ARMENIAN ARCHBISHOP CONDEMNS RECENT BOMBINGS

GF181131 Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 23 Aug 84 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Lebanese-Armenians Remain Firm, United, and Free in Their Stances on Lebanon"]

[Excerpts] The successive explosions on 20 and 21 August, the first against the Hnchak Party Central Club and the second against the Sahak Mesrobyan National School of the St Gevork Church, were widely reported by the Lebanese-Armenian newspapers. On the contrary, uncomprehensive and very brief reports were made by the local press and other news networks. The Lebanese television gave a very brief report after 1 day on its Tuesday night news broadcast, and did not show any pictures. Similar delays in reporting the incident were made by the official radio without giving any details.

Along with other local newspapers the AL-NAHAR and L'ORIENT LE JOUR dailies, which have a good percentage of Armenian readers, finally referred to the criminal deed.

For his part, on the occasion of the criminal act carried out against the Sahak Mesrobyan National School of St Gevork Church in Hadjen District, the prelate of Lebanese-Armenians Archbishop Arab Keshishian visited the church and school and made the following statement to the local and foreign press:

"In the name of the Lebanese-Armenians and all their institutions, bodies, and unions, we condemn with deep resentment the criminal act perpetrated against the St Gevork Church and Sahak Mesrobyan National School in Nor Hajin.

"Indeed, during the recent month this has been the fourth criminal act carried out against the religious, cultural, educational, and sports establishments of Lebanese-Armenians. On 20 July a group of thieves entered the main building of the Armenian national prelacy and robbed the guard's room. A few days later criminal hands burned the AZTAG newspaper paper deport in the courtyard of the national prelacy. On 16 August two bombs exploded in front of the Hnchak club in Khalil al-Badawi District. Yesterday night other bombs exploded at the entrance of the St Gevork Church and Sahak Mesrobyan School.

"It is not possible to remain silent toward these inhumane crimes. Today when all of us Lebanese are holding each other's hands and making our maximum effort to reestablish security and unity in our dear Lebanon, we consider such evil acts as directed primarily against the Lebanese motherland, its unity and peace, and against all the spiritual and moral traditions which form its characteristic structure.

"We also consider these criminal acts directed toward the Armenian people, who feel as one with the crisis, achievements, and aspirations of Lebanon, and who have become the model for Lebanese values, ideals, and human rights, and peoples' freedom in Lebanon and throughout the world.

"However, such evil attempts cannot shake the collective belief and will of the Armenian people and their united stance and active participation for the unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

"Such acts cannot suppress the Armenians in their collective struggle and their inflexible demand for the sake of their human and usurped national rights.

"The Lebanese-Armenians more than ever defend their sectarian obligations and rights."

CSO: 4605/13



## ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

### ARMENIANS ASKED 'TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES' FROM POLITICAL GROUPS

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 8 Sep 84 p 2

[Text] In Wednesday's newspapers (5 Sep 84) there was a news item regarding the discovery and foiling of a plot of an Armenian political group. According to obtained information the group, which calls itself "Followers of Mesrop Mashtots" (an Armenian religious leader who invented the Armenian alphabet early in the fifth century A.D., and translated the four Gospels into Armenian) had planned to create disturbances in a few days. In a section of a hand-written public notice that was obtained from this group there is a hint of a plot to assassinate the Turkish Ambassador on his way to the embassy here. This plot was supposed to have been carried out a few days from now. The present condition of Armenian schools was pointed out in another part of the public notice. In the sick minds of the writers of this notice the reason for the existing problems in Armenian schools is neither violation of the rules or regulations nor the influence of corrupt political events, but rather the constant pressure from the Turkish Government on the school systems and The Armenians. It also states that the Turkish Government, because of its dependence on western politics and because of its membership in NATO and through the use of mutual commercial transactions, tries to create problems and limitations for the Armenian Iranians. Now it is time to ask whether all the Armenians think that way. We do not have any other expectation from political groups who in the course of their action and events think of nothing other than the profits of their masters. However, we do believe that the Armenians have attained their freedom and religious value after the Revolution, since the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, in contrast to all the constitutions of other so-called free nations, has officially recognized this religious minority which comprises less than half percent of the total population of the country.

Before the Islamic Revolution the Armenian churches and other places of worship used to witness small congregations of Armenians, in contrast, today these churches usually cannot accommodate the large number of the present day church-goers.

Here we had better make a brief remark regarding the Armenian schools' situation. Before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Armenians had

private schools. After the victory of the Islamic revolution, when the Armenian schools came under the protection of the government, several groups tried to prevent the close cooperation between different educational organs as far as Armenian schools were concerned. Their excuse was that the Armenian students had to learn their religious teachings in Armenian and be tested likewise.

Meanwhile, these people would support their argument with Article 13 of the Constitution. Article 13 of the Constitution states: The Iranian Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians are the only recognized minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites, and will act in personal matters and religious teachings in accordance with their religious regulations.

The important point in understanding the reality of the situation is that these people have not distinguished between the religious teachings and the method of instruction of religion and the medium of education. Here we would like to make reference to the 15th Principle of the Constitution.

Article 15: The official and common language and script of the people of Iran is Persian (Farsi). Official documents, correspondence and statements, as well as textbooks, must be in this language and script. However, the use of local and nationality languages in their press and mass media is allowed. The teaching of their literature in schools, along with Persian language instructions is also permitted.

Since examination papers and instructional statements are regarded as part and parcel of the official documents of the country, therefore, the exam papers should be written in Persian (Farsi). Here, one might ask: "Should foreign language test papers be subject to the same rule?" In answer it should be said no, those instructions are taught as a foreign language, whereas the Armenian language is a religious one [as published] which can be taught along with other instructions. This matter, which also has the support of the Honorable Council of Guardians and the Supreme Council of Education, has been abused by political groups who in their own way have become a toy and propaganda agents for world arrogance. This subject is used as an excuse for creating disorder and confusion in the Armenian educational system. Foreign newspapers and radios also have concerned themselves with this matter at different times and occasions.

Isn't there a connection between the explosion in the Railway Square, which was fully covered and publicized by foreign radios who pretended to indicate complete internal insecurity throughout this country after this catastrophe, and the plot to assassinate the Turkish ambassador or other explosions?

Finally, we would like to point out that from the view point of the general public, the Armenian people, who have in various ways cooperated with their Muslim brothers of this nation and up to now have had some martyrs in the war front, are separate from the political agitators. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Armenian people and their religious leaders to distance themselves from these deceived elements, and like other religious minorities, enjoy the gift of freedom in the Islamic Republic in the right direction.

12719

CSO: 4640/411

ARMENIAN-AZARBAIJANI CLASHES IN BAKU REPORTED

GF020502 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 14 Sep 84 p 3

[Text] The Armenian SSR newspapers and the Russian newspapers in the Soviet Union have remained silent on Armenian-Azarbaijani clashes. However, the KOMMUNIST daily published in Azarbaijan in its 19 May issue--that is 12 days after the incident--an article entitled "The Hooligans Have Been Punished" which said that on 7 May the "Nefchi" soccer team had a very unsuccessful game in Baku after which "hooligans" took advantage of the soccer players' shock and broke display windows in shops, destroyed shops, and committed other violations.

Thirty people were arrested, some are to be tried while others were sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment. Two students, Safarov, an Azarbaijani, and Arakelyan, an Armenian, have been expelled from school. The lecturers of a number of high schools have received party and administrative punishment.

However, the article does not give the exact and full picture of the incident which can be understood from reading between the lines. It seems the violators are not "hooligans" but students and lecturers. This means that the issue is more serious than what the Baku newspaper is trying to represent. Second, the newspaper does not note that the unsuccessful game of "Nefchi" was against the "Ararat" team of Yerevan, which clarifies the pure national nature of the clashes. Enraged by the defeat of the "Nefchi," Azarbaijanis tried to attack Armenians and avenge their soccer defeat. According to reports, the clashes and fights near the sports stadium were extensive. The Azarbaijanis attacked shops owned by Armenians who resisted their attackers as much as possible.

Let us mention that according to the 1979 population census 475,000 Armenians live in Azarbaijan and in the "Armenkent" district of Baku alone there are 150,000 Armenians.

CSO: 4605/12

# KHALID MUHYI-AL-DIN DISCUSSES BASIC TRENDS

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 31 Aug 84 pp 8-9

[Interview with Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, NPUG Party Leader: "Conflict Brings Out the More Conscious, the More Struggle-Oriented"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Khalid Muhyi-al-Din talks here about the experience of the Grouping Party during the recent legislative elections in Egypt. Apropos, he raises several important issues being considered in the Arab arena. Overt political action, the crisis of the Arab left and of the opposition's relationship with the authorities and the public are all serious issues that require more serious and profound dialogue among the various Arab political and intellectual currents.

## We Insist on Overt Action

[Question] Many do not trust the "openness" of the ruling regimes, especially in our Arab homeland, and insist that legal and overt action is a waste of time and opportunities for change. What is your response to this opinion following what you consider a failed or superficial electoral experience?

[Answer] I insist on overt action because it is legal and worth 10 years of covert action. I can build bases for the party 1 month prior to the elections, while in the past I needed 10 to 20 years of covert action to do the same thing. Ultimately, I am for legal overt action, regardless of the election results. Although we were not represented in the last parliament, we had influence in the Egyptian street and in adopting resolutions. However, the electoral game is governed by the ruling party and the state apparatus. We cannot stand up to it, but I am sure that true democracy will be here one day because every time the parties resort to the presidents who are the worst falsifiers, they lose more significant ground. This is what we noticed from the people's dislike of the National Party.

[Question] Your confidence in the future is great. What are you betting on?

[Answer] I am betting on things piling up. For example, this [past] election campaign cannot be in vain because the government, in order to make things easy on itself, made huge promises which, if fulfilled, will enable us to undertake political action.

[Question] The impact of portraying the Grouping Party as a communist party is what brought about the difficulties for the leftist parties in the Arab countries, these parties with which one may share several analyses, but their contacts with the public are impaired by many obstacles, some attributable to government and some to other residues. How was your work in such a climate?

[Answer] Government obstacles that try to picture us as anti-religion are the weakest because we can, in one encounter with the people, prove the opposite. However, the left, and I believe that this includes the left throughout the Arab nation, has one negative phenomenon: It does not know how to communicate its ideas to the public.

In the Grouping Party, for example, we are against Camp David. However, is this slogan presented in this way in election campaigns?

Foreign issues are usually not basic to the people. Of course, we consider the national issues basic and the center of all other issues. However, the Arab citizen, or at least the Egyptian citizen, is concerned primarily with his daily life.

Therefore, in an election meeting, I cautioned the colleagues in the Grouping Party against raising the slogan of abrogating the treaty because this places the Egyptian citizen in a confrontation with the government over a particular decision. But when we present him with the Zionist danger from a practical viewpoint and assure him that we will always be the enemies of Zionism, we find total response from the public. The slogan of abrogating the treaty is an educated slogan and we must consider the social structure of the people we are trying to reach. We cannot address craftsmen and shopkeepers the same way we do laborers. This is an important issue.

For instance, Lutfi al-Khuli succeeded in including in the reserve list a number of textile factory owners in Shubra al-Khaymah, a district which used to be known for its significant exports to socialist countries. When exports slowed down or stopped, this sector experienced a crisis and a large number of factory owners began complaining about government policy. Our stance on their side was a confirmation of our support of the national bourgeoisie. It is natural that our speech in these circles not be based solely on labor slogans, since workers laid off as a result of factory closings ardently support their benefactors for the sake of reopening the factories.

The day the left finds out how to get across its general ideas to the public and how to apply it, it will have taken an important step forward. The Arab left does not know how to deal with the issue of Israel, particularly as it relates to Camp David. For example, it must clearly answer the following question: Do we want peace with better terms or do we not want peace at all?

My personal reply is that we are for peace with better terms. I cannot tell the citizens that I am against peace altogether. That is why we accepted [the] Fez [summit conference], despite the reactions, with all its terms, including the concessions. Otherwise, we would have rejected peace unequivocally.



It is a real issue and we must be more practical and realistic in order to get closer to the people.

[Question] Has the Grouping experience, which has emerged and grown and, for the first time, embarked upon an election campaign, begun to overcome some of its [own] obstacles? Has it been able to impose itself on Egyptian reality?

[Answer] The [past] elections helped solve a large part of our problems.

We did not disagree over any political issue. Even Fathi al-Jamal, who resigned, declared that his disagreement was non-political.

All that is happening is that during a struggle the more conscious, active and struggle-oriented members stand out.

The Marxist left was the most active. The Marxists do not represent a majority, but are more effective organizationally due to their qualifications. The Grouping did not adopt one Marxist decision. All decisions were unanimous and the election campaign was an opportunity to eliminate the old problems. The general feeling among the members of various currents was that all votes won are for the Grouping as a whole and not for one current to the exclusion of others. We are not against people having Marxist or any other ideas. However, we are also working for implanting the aggregate personality and our conference, which will convene in 6 or 7 months, will crown this course. The Grouping's formula, therefore, is sound and has proven its usefulness.

[Question] You have made several statements about the need to establish a minimum measure of understanding with the Muslim Brotherhood. What is the upshot of that?

[Answer] We did that during the days of al-Sadat. We tried to reunite all the national forces that reject the policy of subjugation to America and Israel, but the Islamic groups refused. This notwithstanding, we defended them when their members were arrested and stood at their side against torture. Then, they agreed to participate with us in the Committee for the Defense of Liberties, a committee we created first within the party in the wake of the 1977 events when 600 party members were arrested. The committee's task turned into the defense and material support of anyone arrested for political reasons.

When we got out of jail in 1981, the other parties, including the Islamic groups, were convinced to participate in a national non-partisan committee which is the National Committee for the Defense of Liberties, and together we opposed all torture cases. Relations with them have improved, but their thinking is still different from ours. Nonetheless, we do not reject dialogue with any party, even the government itself, if it is about an issue that concerns the public interest.

We reject, for example, resorting to violence. Citizens must be investigated justly and tried justly. That is why we were against torture. We urged a great number of our lawyers to defend the Jihad [Organization] members, who in turn asked for Grouping lawyers. It is an impressive phenomenon. A political meeting of the ways; therefore, remains difficult and we can only cooperate on national issues.

[Question] Our question was prompted by the fact that the Brotherhood, for certain reasons, withdrew from the political arena for a period of time as a result of imprisonment. When they returned, they found the opportunity for relatively free elections. Is it a mere coincidence or does it represent a background on which the Brotherhood movement's political thought is based?

[Answer] The alliance was an election-related, self-serving union. Each side was expecting some benefit from its alliance with the other side. The Muslim Brothers are not the Islamic groups. They are a symbol of the religious left. As for their influence with the youth, it has receded. That is why they won only five seats. The Wafd benefitted from its alliance with it by getting the vote of a good number of the religious left.

[Question] But the brotherhood has long been known for its cooperation with the right and its stances toward the left.

[Answer] I asked one of their leaders how they could enter into an alliance with a party that called for rapprochement with America. His answer was that the Wafd Party did not enjoin commitment, while the left is a commitment and their alliance with it would commit them to its positions.

Furthermore, most of the currents are closer to the Wafd than to others due to their class make-up and general orientation. Nonetheless, the bases of the Islamic currents are leftist and support the public sector and justice. Their leaderships, however, are something else.

It must be noted here that the left is largely responsible for the enmity among the Muslims since it has not given religious thought and the Islamic heritage their fair share of study. In the book, "Religion and Socialism," I emphasized that we wanted to win the battle, a feat that requires courage. We advocate justice and a good part of religion is a call for justice. We all refuse to make Islam a temporal order. It is a sum of principles in light of which people must build their orders.

I say that the Grouping's program is the practical application of Islam's principles. He who has another written program (not in the Koran or the Sunna) let him come forward for debate. To limit the program to the Koran or the Sunna is to prevent debate since the program is changeable, but the Koran and the Sunna are not.

The left does not have the courage to enter this field. If it did, it would overcome one of the obstacles in the way of its mass appeal.

However, we say that Islam did not deal with all issues, since there are some modern ones.

[Question] Has the enlightened religious current registered any growth?

[Answer] This requires effort, but it has begun to meet special responses in the university.

There is also the Christian current which is greatly alarmed by the principle of suspending the Islamic Shari'ah. The Grouping Party offered it a solution. The Islamic Shari'ah will be circumscribed in civil status laws, thus rendering Muslims and Christians equal before it. Consequently, the Christian would be a first class citizen, not second class as has been feared.

12502

CSO: 4504/438

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SUBSIDIES SITUATION DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 816, 3 Sep 84 pp 4-5

[Article by Dr 'Ali Lutfi, professor and chairman of the Department of Economics in the School of Commerce at 'Ayn Shams University and former minister of finance: "Who Is Entitled to Subsidies?"]

[Text] The question of subsidies is considered to be one of the most critical issues confronting the economy, because of the economic, social, and political dimensions of this issue.

Official reports tell us that there has been a steady increase--at ever-increasing rates--in our direct subsidies year after year. In 1960 subsidies in the nation's public budget amounted to only 9 million Egyptian pounds. But then subsidies began to increase, and by the fiscal year 1982-83 they constituted 2.04 billion Egyptian pounds of the public budget.

This enormous increase in subsidies is attributable to three principle causes, which are the following--the steadily increasing population, the increase in the average consumption per individual of subsidized goods, and the steady increase in world prices.

We would like to first of all emphasize the fact that elimination of the subsidies is something which is not at all foreseen because the subsidy system is something which has the aim of achieving a series of social, political, and economic objectives. Perhaps the most important of these objectives is the redistribution of income by means of influencing the relative prices of various commodities in such a way as to lead to the redistribution of real income among individuals. In addition to this, the subsidy system represents an effort to achieve stability of the prices of basic commodities. Finally, the subsidy system is something which leads to an improvement in the nutritional level of persons with limited income.

In actual fact, the subsidy system, as applied in its present form in Egypt, is something which has numerous shortcomings. For this reason it is necessary and vital that there be efficient distribution of the subsidies. Perhaps the most important shortcomings of the present subsidy system in Egypt could be summed up as being the following:

1. The subsidies increase at rapid rates every year. This has led to an increase in the deficit in the nation's public budget and consequently to an increase in prices.
2. The increase in the subsidies adversely affects the balance of payments and increases the deficit which it suffers from.
3. The present subsidy system leads to abuse concerning the subsidized goods and to an increase in the quantities of these goods which are consumed because consumers are not aware of their actual value. Perhaps bread is the clearest example of a commodity in this category.
4. The present subsidy system enables certain individuals to unjustly acquire huge amounts of money. Furthermore, they do not pay any taxes on this money because it is illegal income. Perhaps the best example of a commodity in this category is the high-grade flour which is largely utilized for the making of sweets and pasta.
5. The present subsidy system leads to the emergence of a black market where the subsidized goods are sold at prices which are higher than the prices [legally] set for them.
6. The present subsidy system has led to one bad feature which previously was unknown in Egyptian society. This feature is the appearance of long lines of people in front of the consumer organization stores and the crowding and fighting which we see there every day--a thing which gives these consumer organization stores a bad name. The result of this is that many people who are entitled to subsidies do not get their fair share of subsidized goods.
7. Indirect subsidies cause some of the public sector firms to suffer huge losses and suffer from a lack of monetary liquidity. This is something which prevents the application of the policy of replacing and renovating [older means of production] and constitutes an obstacle to production.

#### The Meaning of Rationalizing Subsidies

On the basis of the aforementioned one may say that "the efficient distribution of subsidies" means guaranteeing that the subsidies reach those who are entitled to them, and at the same time alleviating the burdens placed on the shoulders of the nation's public budget in order to make it possible to decrease the deficit in the budget and consequently stop the rise in prices.

We believe that the policy of achieving an efficient distribution of subsidies is one which is based on three basic approaches, which are the following:

1. Increasing production--particularly the production of subsidized goods such as wheat, sugar, etc.--limiting the rate of increase in consumption, and influencing patterns of consumption so that they proceed along a sound path. This approach, of course, requires enormous investments and the expenditure of great efforts, and the results of such investments and efforts



can only be seen in the long run. In spite of this fact, it is necessary to immediately begin with this approach in order that its good results not be delayed for too long and in order that we not increasingly depend on imports in order to provide ourselves with basic commodities such as wheat--because this will involve great political risks for us and because it will be difficult to obtain wheat in the future from the world markets.

2. Elimination of all the types of waste which are encountered in the process of furnishing subsidized goods, whether as a result of increases in administrative costs or commissions charged by suppliers, suppliers' agents, banks, etc. At the end of this study we will deal in detail with this approach.

3. Conversion of commodity subsidies into monetary subsidies. This is something which should take place gradually--that is, over the course of at least 5 years. In other words, the efficient distribution of subsidies requires gradually changing the prices of subsidized goods and services until they reach their normal price levels in accordance with the economy. However, this should simultaneously be accompanied by an appropriate increase in the incomes of individuals entitled to receive the subsidies--as opposed to those who are not entitled to receive the subsidies.

It is clear that such a new subsidy system would totally eliminate all of the shortcomings previously alluded to which have arisen as a result of the present subsidy system.

In other words, the benefits of the new subsidy system being proposed could be briefly summed up as being the following--rationalization of consumption, elimination of the black market, elimination of lines of people standing in front of the consumer organization stores, guaranteeing that the subsidies reach those who are entitled to them, reduction of the deficit in the nation's public budget and consequently a decrease in the rate of price increases, reduction of the deficit in the balance of payments, and making sure that the subsidies do not reach those who are not entitled to them and consequently the achievement of social justice.

#### Who Is Entitled to the Subsidies?

We must now take up the question of which groups of people are entitled to receive the subsidies and which groups of people are not entitled to receive them.

We believe that the best thing would be to initially state which groups of people are not entitled to receive the subsidies. They are the following:

1. People working in the professions.
2. Independent tradesmen.
3. Owners of factories, workshops, and stores.

4. Owners of import and export offices and commercial representatives.
5. Persons possessing more than 10 feddans of land.
6. Employees on official leave of absence, employees who contract to work abroad, and emigrants.
7. Employees in companies established in accordance with the provisions of the Investment Law, except for employees performing auxiliary services.
8. Employees in international organizations which have offices in Egypt, except for employees performing auxiliary services.
9. Employees in the League of Arab and Islamic Nations and organizations affiliated with it, except for employees performing auxiliary services.
10. Employees in foreign embassies and consulates in Egypt, except for employees performing auxiliary services.
11. Employees in Egyptian embassies, consulates, and offices abroad, except for employees performing auxiliary services.
12. Employees in the American University of Cairo, except for employees performing auxiliary services.
13. Any individual whose net annual income exceeds 720 Egyptian pounds, regardless of whether or not it is taxable.
14. Any family whose net annual income exceeds 2,500 Egyptian pounds, regardless of whether or not it is taxable. (By "family" here we mean a group of individuals living in the same housing unit.)
15. Foreign tourists and experts.

We note that some persons within the categories of people who are not entitled to the subsidies might actually be entitled to the subsidies. For example, an individual might own a small store selling miscellaneous articles which is located on a side street in one of the low-income areas of town and this individual might have a large number of family members dependent on him. Such a person consequently is entitled to subsidies. In order that such exceptional cases be dealt with--and there are, of course, few of them--it is possible for such individuals to submit requests that they be entitled to these subsidies which they should be receiving in view of their condition and their circumstances. These cases could then be studied and decisions could be made concerning them on the basis of the results of the studies made. (This system would be similar to the one currently followed in the case of special pensions and benefits.)

From the practical point of view, the incomes of individuals entitled to monetary subsidies could be increased as follows:

A. Determining the average share per individual of direct and indirect subsidies in accordance with the present subsidy system. This could be done by means of listing the price differentials and quantities of goods determined for each individual.

B. Distribution of the average share per individual of the subsidies (in accordance with the paragraph above) over a number of years--for example, 5 years. If the average share per individual of the subsidies is, for example, 60 Egyptian pounds per year, then his annual increase in income would be 20 Egyptian pounds for a period of 5 years, bearing in mind that the increase in incomes would be restricted to the groups of persons entitled to receive subsidies.

C. The head of a family could receive the monetary subsidies for all of the members of his family. If there are six members of such a family, for example, the income of the head of the family could be increased 120 Egyptian pounds per year for a period of 3 years. In other words, the increase would be 10 Egyptian pounds per month during the first year, 20 Egyptian pounds during the second year, and so forth.

D. The monetary subsidies could be paid out to those entitled to them as follows:

1. They could be paid out monthly along with salaries. This could be done in the case of employees in the government, public organizations, and public sector companies, employees in special pay categories, temporary employees, seasonal employees, and employees hired on the basis of comprehensive remuneration.

2. The subsidies could be paid out monthly along with pensions and benefits. This could be done in the case of those receiving regular pensions and benefits and those receiving Sadat pensions.

3. As far as the private sector is concerned, the subsidies could be paid out monthly along with salaries. The employers could then be reimbursed for the subsidy payments by receiving refunds from the public treasury of the government in the form of three or four lump-sum payments per year.

4. As for employees working in the sector of agriculture, their subsidies could be paid out by the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit.

In order that this system be successful, we recommend that the following be done:

A. This system and alternatives to it should be brought up for discussion on a very broad scale and the opinions of various organizations should be sounded out before the system is put into practice. We are confident that, if this is done in a scientific and unbiased manner, that is, if no influence is exercised by pressure groups--particularly those groups of individuals

who unjustly obtain large amounts of money under the present subsidy system-- the new proposed subsidy system will be agreed to.

B. An intensive awareness campaign should be undertaken in order to convince Egypt's citizens of the virtues of this system.

C. Prices should be rigorously monitored in order that no one be allowed to raise prices.

D. It should be emphasized quite clearly, and via practical examples, that those individuals entitled to subsidies will be receiving amounts of money which will permit them to obtain the same quantities of subsidized goods. In fact, there will be money left over. This surplus money will appear as a result of rationalizing the utilization of subsidized goods after their prices are changed.

E. The amount of monetary subsidies determined for each individual should be revised each year in order that it be increased in order to keep up with the rise in prices. This should be done in order to maintain the standard of living of citizens who are entitled to subsidies, and it is necessary to link increases in wages to increases in production.

9468

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## UNIVERSAL FEAR SAID TO PREVAIL IN WAKE OF TERROR CAMPAIGN

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 18, 5 Sep 84 pp 3-5

[Text]

The campaign of terror that has been waged throughout Libya in the past three months is a direct result of the attempted coup in Tripoli against Col. **Gadaffi** on 8 May. Immediately after the coup attempt, security forces, drawn mainly from the revolutionary committee movement, swept through the southern part of Tripoli and elsewhere in the country in a house-to-house search for weapons and sympathisers connected with the authors of the coup. Between 500 and 3,000 arrests have been reported.

An intensive search was made for members of the commandos associated with the coup attempt who had escaped from Tripoli. On 12 May the coup leader, **Wadji ash-Shwehdi**, trapped with six companions in a residential area on the outskirts of Tripoli, was killed. Five days after that, the last commando member known to be at large, **Salim Ibrahim al-Qadhafi**, was killed in farm buildings in the Tripoli area. Meanwhile 'popular justice', via the 'basic popular congresses', throughout Libya sought out supposed dissidents and executed them. In all cases, the accused were said to be members or supporters of the CIA and Muslim Brotherhood - an organisation that the regime particularly dislikes. A competitor for influence in the wider Arab world, the Brotherhood considers **Gadaffi** a heretic. The CIA was said to be disrupting Libyan society by assassinations and economic sabotage directed at supermarkets and petrol stations.

The first two to die were **Sasi Ali Sasi Zikri** and **Ahmad Ali Ahmad Sulayman**, who were hanged in public in the mountain town of Nalut, close to the Tunisian border, on 3 June. A day later **Muhammad Said ash-Shabani** was hanged in public. The following day **Sadeq Shweideh** was hanged in Benghazi and **Othman Zarti** in Tripoli. The latter two were condemned by the local basic popular congress - which doubled as a revolutionary tribunal - and were executed within one hour of their arrest. **Sadeq Shweideh** had just voluntarily returned from the US



in response to a request to attend a 'revolutionary seminar'. On 7 June **Rajab Abdessalam al-Mahdi** was hanged in Tobruk and **Umar Abd al-Bari** and **Mansur Fannush al-Mijbiri** in the oasis town of Jalu. On 12 June **Farhat Al-nar Hlab** was hanged in the western coastal town of Zuwarah.

It was then announced in Tripoli that 'suicide squads' were to be formed in Libya and abroad to combat dissidents - particularly in Sudan, where the major dissident group, the *National Salvation Front for Libya* (NSF), is based. (In Greece, where the first such suicide squad was announced in mid-May, four Libyan dissidents were killed during a visit by Libyan foreign liaison bureau secretary, **Abdessalam Triki**, in late June and a further three were killed during mid-July).

The campaign of terror had died down by the beginning of August - in time for the 15th anniversary of the 'Glorious September 1 Revolution' at the end of the month. But the regime remains seriously unsettled. The break in diplomatic relations with Britain has shut off Libya from one of its most important commercial and financial outlets. And there has been a series of incidents inside Libya during the past six weeks which indicate the depth of popular disaffection with the regime. (AC Vol 25 No 9).

It has proved difficult to establish precisely what happened in Tripoli on 8 May. Accounts at the time were confused, with rumours from Cairo of a planned coup and early reports of Gadaffi's death inside the barracks where he lives. Later on, the reports of an attack on the Bab al-Assiziya barracks were denied. Libya argued that its security forces had successfully surprised a dissident commando force - estimated at between 15 and 30-strong - in a residential building in central Tripoli (the barracks lie towards the south of the city, on a main road towards the airport) *before* it was able to launch an attack on the barracks. Despite the fact that hostages had been taken, Libyan media claimed the commandos were killed without injury to the hostages. The incidents in Tripoli were linked with the killing of an eminent dissident, **Ahmad Ahwas**, and the arrest of his two companions at Zuwarah two days before, just after they had apparently crossed the border from Tunisia.

Characteristically the official reports exaggerated and conflated events into a truculent justification of the Jamahiriyah, with a touch of hysteria at the threat posed to the Colonel's regime. There certainly were arrests at Zuwarah on 6 May, during which Ahmad Ahwas was killed, and there was also a gun battle in central Tripoli two days later. However, it did involve the Bab al-Azziziya barracks and was a far more severe threat to the regime than it has

publicly admitted - not least because it was the first evidence of organised resistance to the regime since the early days of the revolution. The irony is that the attack was a belated attempt to recover from the damage Ahwas' death did to organised resistance inside Libya, just as his Libyan mission was a hurried attempt to exploit the situation created by the London embassy siege. It was certainly not what opposition groups had originally planned and arose as much from the tension within the dissident movement as from conditions inside Libya.

Plans for some sort of open demonstration of resistance to the regime were originally made because of considerable discontent among dissidents abroad over the lack of action, despite increased training and organisation over the past four years. Frustration was most evident within the NSF. It had been the most active in preparing for violent action, with training programmes in Morocco and Sudan. The Front also maintained a policy of active cooperation with fundamentalist groups, such as the *Muslim Brotherhood* and the *Islamic Liberation Party* - a Brotherhood offshoot from the 1950s, inspired by the Palestinian resistance movement and dedicated to recreating the ideal society of primitive Islam under the first four caliphs. Members associated with these groups bitterly complained of the lack of effective action against the regime. Their complaints persuaded Ahwas, a founder member of the NSF and a close confidant of NSF leader Dr. al-Mugharief, that some action inside Libya was essential to maintain the cohesiveness of the organisation. As detailed planning developed, the siege of the People's Bureau in London exploded and a decision was made to exploit the situation by accelerating the planned action.

At the same time, incidents inside Libya, some apparently carried out by NSF members, particularly against obvious economic targets, such as supermarkets and petrol stations, encouraged more sanguine planning. Exactly what was planned has never been made clear, though some observers suggested that it might have involved an attack on the important communications centre of Ghariyan, in the Jabal Nafusa, just behind the Jefara plain in which Tripoli is situated. Disaffection in the Jabal has long been widespread, partly because of the regime's ambivalent attitude towards the region, since its members are Berber Ibadis, considered to be opposed to the Sirt-based Gadaffi regime, and partly because of the region's long-standing tradition of smuggling with Tunisia, which made it particularly vulnerable to NSF infiltration.

In the event, the capture of Ahwas and his two colleagues - accounts differ as to whether Ahwas was killed immediately or after being arrested at

Zuwarah police station when he realised that detection was inevitable and opened fire on his captors - fouled the original plan. Ahwas and his companions were almost certainly discovered because travel arrangements to Tripoli failed and they were spotted in Zuwarah by an alert policeman. Once the news of his death was made public the following day, the members of the commando awaiting his arrival in Tripoli realised that it would only be a matter of time before the authorities located them. Hence the attack on Gadaffi's headquarters simply to demonstrate in public that opposition to the regime existed.

#### **The fateful May day**

At 7.30 am on Tuesday 8 May the 15-man commando unit prepared to attack the Bab al-Assiziya barracks, which is on one of the main roads around the south of Tripoli towards the airport. The main entrance is guarded by dug in tanks. The commando leaders decided that entry into the barracks required a diversion. A block of flats on the road leading into the centre of Tripoli from the road junction was chosen as a suitable target for attack. Under cover of the diversion the commandos penetrated the barracks.

The interior of the barracks, which are roughly circular and surrounded by highly sophisticated defences and a high wall, is divided into two sections by a wall across the centre. In the front portion, by the main gate, are office buildings and accommodation for the guards detachment at the gate. The office buildings, which are to the right of the main gate, include Gadaffi's office and other administrative units. The Colonel's personal quarters are behind the wall. Once inside the barracks the commandos engaged guards detachments in the frontal section and attempted to get to the rear area. They failed. But the office blocks and the guards' quarters were badly damaged. Gadaffi's quarters were hit, probably by cross-fire. Up to 80 Libyan troops and nine commandos were killed. The remainder escaped in the early afternoon to join the survivors from the diversionary attack. All were caught four days later.

The reaction of the authorities to the attack was to seal off central Tripoli, causing massive traffic jams throughout the morning. Instead of regular army and police units, revolutionary committee members began an immediate search for associates of the dissidents. Presumably they had information obtained from Ahmad Ahwas and his companions. Central Tripoli was sealed off. Revolutionary committee personnel were also apparently involved in the burning down of a building close to the old Royal Palace. Possibly the remnants of the commando were hiding there. Tripoli gradually returned to normal during the afternoon. The searches and hou-

se-to-house investigations that were to herald the subsequent reign of terror, then began.

Gadaffi was not in the barracks when the attack was launched. He was at a horse show. Within hours of the coup attempt he was walking in the streets of Tripoli for the benefit of Western journalists and TV cameras. Gadaffi's confidence is probably misplaced, for a number of obvious reasons:

- A highly public attempt was made on his life by a well-organised and armed group.
- The attack went ahead despite the arrest earlier of part of the group at Zuwarah, and despite Libyan security's efforts to obtain the plans by interrogation.
- Dissidents within the country are well-organised, are adequately equipped and have widespread sympathy. The last point was evident in the time it took for the surviving members of the commando to be traced. Libya is one of the most highly militarised societies in the world. Informers are meant to be pervasive.

Gadaffi has failed to persuade the population to accept the idiosyncratic principles of his revolution, and his lavishly equipped and extremely expensive security forces failed to prevent a relatively simple plot.

For the scattered and fissiparous dissident movements, the lessons are more ambiguous. Though the prime mover in the coup attempt was the NSF - other groups refused to participate - it is clear that the real force for active opposition to the regime is based in fundamentalist groups associated with the resistance. All dissident groups now fear that they will be forced themselves by popular pressure to rely on right-wing religious elements. The carefully constructed network of dissidents and sympathisers inside Libya has now been partly dismantled by the authorities. The slow process of rebuilding the network has already started.

Though the regime might well retain power for several years, it cannot claim again that disaffection and dissidence is irrelevant, or that the regime enjoys massive popular support. And the sacrifices made by commando members cannot fail to have impressed people as they come uncomfortably to terms with the shortages, inconveniences and petty injustices that increasingly characterise Gadaffi's ideal state of popular sovereignty. One of the dissident commandos appears to have been captured only when he tried to gun down members of a popular committee in a final kamikaze gesture ●

**Footnote:**

A secret organisation, depending directly on Gadaffi, which is designed to coax the apathetic and dispirited 'popular committees' to an appropriate level of 'revolutionary awareness' ●

## COUNTRY'S PRESENT SITUATION DESCRIBED

Paris LE MONDE in French 16-17 Sep 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by Eric Rouleau, special correspondent: "Cultural Revolution, Libyan Style: How Col al-Qadhdhafi Intends To Lead His Country Toward a 'Free and Happy Society'"]

[Text] Tripoli--4 months after the "events" of 8 May--an understatement that people here resort to in order to designate the pitched battle in which Islamist opponents fought the Revolutionary Guard in the center of the capital--order appears to have been re-established from one end to the other of the Libyan Jamahiriyah (Government of the Masses). In any case, one no longer hears talk of murder attempts and sabotage in military bases and state-run supermarkets, such as those that marked the early months of this year. The echoes of the dispute in popular circles and the grumbling in the army have stopped reaching the ears of foreign observers. Col al-Qadhdhafi announced triumphantly in a 1 September speech before the people's general congress (the equivalent of a parliament) that he had succeeded in "crushing the errant dogs of American imperialism as one crushes cats" (sic).

The repression that was exercised basically against the traditionalist Muslims was pitiless and occasionally spectacular. Radio and television broadcasted, in the first 2 weeks of June, the "confessions" of those who had been trained in the Sudan by American instructors to give themselves over to acts of violence and assassinate the country's principal leaders. The public hangings--a dozen, according to the authorities--that followed also received the broadest publicity on the small screen. Officials were more discreet on the subject of the arrests that were made, which were counted in the hundreds, if not the thousands. Many of the suspects having been released after being interrogated in the camps where they were sorted out, it is virtually impossible to put forward a reliable figure.

The Jabal Nafusah--the mountainous mass that borders Tripolitania on the south--was severely affected by the repression. Populated largely by Berbers belonging to the Kharyite wing of Islam, the Jabal was thought to be a hideout for opponents and a center of subversion. Muslims, puritan and conservative, and a number of Berbers mounted a silent resistance to the socio-economic upheavals carried out by Col al-Qadhdhafi, whom they consider a "godless person" because of his very free interpretation of the Prophet's precepts.



The opposition seems to have been decimated and decapitated. If the news arriving at Arab embassies is to be believed, persons hostile to the Libyan regime who had taken refuge in Morocco were delivered by Rabat to the authorities in Tripoli, even before the union treaty was concluded between the two countries on 13 August of this year.

Although it is true that Libya thus emerged from the storm zone, nevertheless the Draconian security measures have not been abolished. Since last May, diplomats can no longer move about except in regions situated outside the southern half of the territory and the border provinces. On the other hand, it is no longer possible to communicate directly abroad, the automatic telephone line system having been disconnected.

Col al-Qadhdhafi is known to be fond of challenges. Shortly before the bid for power of 8 May, he "revealed" to the people's general congress, he intended to renounce his role as "guide of the revolution." "After a quarter of a century of incessant fighting, including 15 years in power, of battles crowned by successive victories," he declared, "I was planning either to retire to the desert or expatriating myself to Syria, Lebanon or Latin America or somewhere else to continue the fight." However, he added, "the odious actions by the terrorist bands of the Muslim Brothers, those mercenaries of American imperialism, encouraged me to renounce my plan, which would have filled the United States with joy." Instead of withdrawing from the dispute, instead of compromising with those who were hoping for a halt in the "revolutionary march," Col al-Qadhdhafi decided to go on the offensive, to further radicalize the "new society" whose content and contours he had outlined in his "Green Book", the ideologic bible of the Jamahiryah. "It would be an imbecility not to pursue the revolution to its end!", he exclaimed before the people's general congress, before reporting to them his plan for doing so.

#### "To Annihilate the Parasitic Middle Class"

His plan, which brings to mind the cultural revolution in China, is in more than one respect a surprisingly bold one. Judge for yourself: Col al-Qadhdhafi intends "to annihilate the parasitic middle class"; private property having already been virtually abolished, he defines that category of citizens as those who "draw from the public treasury, possess houses and cars, benefit from social advantages furnished by the state without themselves furnishing any productive labor." He would aim essentially at the high officials who populate the cities. "Those people," he believes, "are bored, whereas the inhabitants of the rural areas are not bored." Consequently, they must be deprived of the "social privileges such as the telephone, the highways, the sewers, the drinking water, the social security" before they become part of the productive sectors of the economy, before they go to work in the factories and in the fields.

Once these "bureaucratic bourgeois" have been removed, the civil service will be gradually abolished in favor of self-management by the people, to which Col al-Qadhdhafi has given the name of "spreading to the masses", a concept that is close to Lenin's theory of the "decline of the state." In the meantime he proposes that the various ministries (the "people's secretariats") be dispersed as rapidly as possible throughout the country, each region of which would be, in itself, a quasi-autonomous Jamahiryah. In fact, these new departments would be given their own legislative and executive organisms and would run all of the

economic, financial, social and cultural activities, with the help of a budget fed by locally-levied taxes and duties. Labor will be entirely collectivized and specialization will be eliminated insofar as possible; citizens will learn several professions so that they can be interchangeable. In the cities and in the country, the inhabitants will found "people's cooperatives", "cells of the future free and happy society", which would organize the work and the amusement, which would accomplish the tasks that are presently the province of the state.

#### To Give up Individual Automobiles

Already, in Tripoli, the highway department has ceased functioning, the inhabitants being responsible for organizing by neighborhoods to sweep the streets and pick up garbage. Needless to say, this pilot experiment is far from conclusive. Austerity will be the rule until Libya reaches "the era of self-sufficiency"; unbridled consumption, stated the "guide of the revolution", has corrupted the society. The way of life will have to be changed, "luxury products such as individual automobiles" will have to be given up, the hours the supermarkets are open will have to be reduced, a "hierarchy of needs" will have to be established, the products that will be put on sale will have to be carefully selected. "Consumers' associations", which will operate without profit, will serve as intermediaries between the "commercial exploitation" that has already been abolished and the "people's markets" that in the future will operate at the heart of a "society of abundance."

The plan is more than ambitious, it is perilous. As exalted as the radiant future Col al-Qadhdhafi promises his people may be, there is no doubt that, should he put it into operation, he would bump up against too many established interests, however modest they may be, that he will not be able to weaken a society or customs or secular traditions without running into strong resistance. To surmount the foreseeable obstacles, he has buckled down to the task of refining the "basic people's congresses" that are adjudged too "tepid" with respect to his permanent revolution, to creating others, to further increasing the number of "revolutionary committees" responsible for indoctrinating and training the population.

His strategy includes at the same time more flexible diplomacy intended to break up the isolation of the Jamahiriyah, notably by normalizing its relations with its neighbors in the Maghreb and by settling the disputes that coming between Tripoli and Paris. In this regard, in diplomatic circles no one is ruling out concrete proposals that should lead to the withdrawal of Libyan and French forces from Chad.

8946

CSO: 4519/253

# AL-TURABI LINKED TO ALLEGED ARMS SHIPMENT FROM TEHRAN

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 338, 3 Sep 84 pp 17-18

[Article: "With Iranian Arms and Libyan Training, al-Turabi Plans for Succession"]

[Text] Last July, the hands of the clock stood still in the Sudanese security agency, since a serious situation had been uncovered concerning long-standing connections between al-Turabi and his group and the Tehran regime.

The situation was the discovery of a shipment of Iranian arms sent from Tehran to the "Brotherhood" in Sudan. This situation was not the first, but it stressed the fact that al-Turabi and his supporters had chosen a path that passed through Tehran to arrive at the overthrow of the palace, for which some of them are gatekeepers, and that the Brotherhood's plans had entered a dangerous stage.

In brief, the story is that al-Turabi and his group for some time had bet on their alliance with the Khomeyni regime. It was no mistake or exaggeration that some entered early-on into this relationship, an important spoke in the Brotherhood's wheel.

By this means, they might or might not reach their dream of ruling alone. What distinguishes al-Turabi and his supporters in the dream of single-handed power is that they make a complete distinction between the institution of individual rule and the personality of the single ruler. Therefore, they believe that between them and their ultimate goal there are two pages. The first is smooth and voluntary, while the second in their belief is bloody and compulsory.

The first begins with the alliance with autocracy and support for it and ends with control over its institutions and decisions. The second begins with the autocrat's isolation and ends with his rapidity and confrontation of the results, results which they are far from reality in estimating. In order to understand the Brotherhood's plans, in all of their overt and covert pages, one must go back to the beginning. One must understand deeply and fully the basic aspects in these plans, which are: first, the Brotherhood as a political force allied with the Numayri regime; second, the

Brotherhood as an economic force under the aegis of the regime; and third, the Brotherhood as a military force behind the regime's back.

It is a historic fact that the rank and file of this organization, before the rightist conciliation, were not qualified to listen to the dreams of its grand master. Therefore, the grand master was forced to impose the conciliation upon them. He offered himself to his domestic opponents as a critic of his organization that had overtasked the jails. His cadres turned their backs on him and "shaved off their beards," as the expression goes. From the experience of the limited opposition, into which they plunged, within the "National Front," al-Turabi and his close supporters discovered that their organization, which wanted its role to be a right-wing reserve, its philosophy and educated column, was destined to live in isolation at the bottom of the trench that he had chosen, as is his situation in popular circles. None of the Ansar were happy to associate with them, nor were the masses of the unionists and their leaders. The only option to keep them on the political map was for the regime to accept them, and for them to accept it. Therefore, when the conciliation between Numayri and Sadiq al-Mahdi was imposed by Arab and international powers, al-Turabi and his supporters grabbed at it, clung to it tenaciously and desired it more than the original parties.

Al-Turabi, by endorsing the alliance with the regime, did not give his supporters a political mistake, which went beyond establishing themselves as an elite, building a new facade for the pyramid, the regime's Socialist Union Party and its followers. Therefore, the role of al-Turabi and his supporters entered into the ups and downs of the regime and its sole party, suffering isolation in popular circles. They were pleased with the regime and gave themselves completely to its institutions and, at the appropriate time, to its security apparatus, and it was pleased with them.

At that time, Numayri was very well aware of the crises of his regime. He worked for the alleged conciliation and welcomed Sadiq al-Mahdi and his supporters and al-Turabi and his proteges. Perhaps at that time, Numayri was grinning from ear to ear at the disgruntled among the senior May marshals without troops. They fought with the new boys on the block (the Socialist Union, the People's Assembly, the students and the youth, etc.) for the barren institutions that they believe they themselves had established and hence they believe they have the right to have complete control over them. Why shouldn't the ruler smile at an organized column of deal-makers. They easily joined in with his regime, especially since their pay came out of someone else's pocket more than out of his. The reward of al-Turabi and his supporters was more than they had expected, and they were greedy for even more, or rather, they dreamed rapaciously of their benefactor, so that they could elegize him. Therefore, their plans crystallized in the direction of the May autocracy.

Undoubtedly, the current economic influence of al-Turabi and his supporters was a foreign gift, but at the same time, it was also the fruit of the deteriorating economic situation under the aegis of the May



regime, or rather, it was their share in the organized thievery that the regime (their ally) practises against the people and the destinies of its generations. Normal economic life in Sudan has ceased. The regime is incapable of carrying out its basic tasks, whether in providing the basic social services in education, health, transportation, communications, housing, electricity, water, etc, or in providing the necessary requirements for the citizens in terms of commodities, consumer goods, production and investment, or in managing the civil service and the public sector in industry, agriculture, etc. On the contrary, it intends to destroy them.

Moreover, the matter is even worse now, with regard to the regime's fulfillment of its foreign obligations, headed by payment of debt instalments and interest. This amounts to a total of \$14 billion, by the regime's admission, and it is continuously increasing.

Naturally, this comes under the regime's total impotence, so that all it has is one option of two parts:

1. Oppose the people who demand their rights and freedom and who want to bring down the regime in order to save themselves and their nation. In this opposition, the regime uses either emergency laws and courts, jails and detention camps, and the cover of the Islamic Shari'ah, or a spate of attempts to appoint bogus institutions to represent the people, in the face of the true expression of the people's will, which crystallized recently in political and trade-union opposition under the banner of the Sudanese People's Assembly.

2. Pursue the increase in foreign indebtedness and mortgaging, and increase the local currency on the one hand, and on the other hand, give the tasks of providing the needs of the citizenry to the parasitic class of nouveau riche Mayists and to the laws that were enacted by the brokerage market and the black market, and prepare and announce the regime's decrees. All this is at the expense of the majority of the people whose poverty increases to the same extent that the pockets of those who suck their sweat and blood are filled with loot.

All that remains in the economic life of Sudan is the import and export market, exporting agricultural products (vegetable and animal) and importing consumer goods. Between the imports and the exports are the customs, the commercial licenses, the commissions and the financing, the evasion of taxes, the brokers, the black market, etc., a nest of corruption protected by the regime's umbrella with the parasites formulating its unstable laws in their own interests. This narrow corner, into which the Sudanese economic system has been squeezed, suffers from basic difficulties. Of course, the most important is not the deterioration of quantity and quality of production, nor the inadequacy of imports for the requirements of the citizens. This is a matter that more or less does not occur to the regime. On the contrary, the most important difficulties with which the regime and its class are concerned are:



1. Rising costs of production and, consequently, the rise in the prices of domestic products which makes them noncompetitive in foreign markets.
2. High taxes and fees, which the regime is compelled to collect from exports. This makes the exported commodities even weaker in competition with foreign markets.
3. The problem of increasing funding commensurate with the rise of local prices, as well as increasing markets, which would give a satisfactory price and, consequently, a reasonable profit for the exporters.

In light of this economic collapse, al-Turabi and his supporters in the Mayist regime became an organized column of agents. All difficulties were removed from their path. The Islamic banks were their first choice. They were able to be stockholders in them, members of their boards, and their agents and brokers. They benefited from their facilities and their loans. Moreover, these banks worked with them in what remained of the economic activity in Sudan. Using the banks' influence with the regime, they derived tax exemptions on their exports, and were provided with subsidized markets. We touched on this before, when we described al-Turabi's economic influence as being a foreign gift and the fruits of the collapse of the Sudanese economy, or rather, their share of the regime's stealing the food of the people and rewarding al-Turabi and his supporters for their alliance with it. After all of this, was it not their right to dominate the senior Mayist nouveau riche, in order to imprison and flog some of them and make others bow down submissively. Or rather, was it not their right to plan the coup de grace for the Mayist regime, their ally, and take over its good life, so that they could monopolize all the good life? Therefore, is it not the right of all the people to vent their wrath equally upon them as they did on the regime?

Al-Turabi and his supporters were so enthusiastic over their plans that their eyes became blinded, closed by their dreams. They became fascinated by what they had achieved and could no longer tolerate even their long-standing allies in the Charter Front, the Ansar of the Sunnah. When the clouds of the dispute between Sadiq al-Mahdi and the regime were dispersed, they offered themselves as mediators, in order to put their stamp on the role of their ally, whose conciliation they had stolen, particularly since they believed that the regime was ripe for their picking. Their plans interrupted its long-range political goals, when the regime was convinced to apply the Islamic Shari'ah and announced the emergency laws and courts. Under the cover of this emergency situation, they found their opportunity to carry out fully their role of treating the people as the enemy, through terrorism, emergency courts, the issuance of laws to dissolve trade unions, beginning with professional guilds, giving the regime's security agency lists of trade unionists and national opposition politicians, and helping it with the arrest campaigns. When al-Turabi and his supporters thought that they were on the threshold of the last series of plans for their autocracy, they quickened their pace. Al-Turabi plunged into a widespread organized campaign against the senior Mayists, or against "the trash," as it pleased him to call them. In

accordance with a plan to eliminate those who remained on the regime's staff, his supporters moved to gather up documents and evidence of their corruption, beginning with 'Umar al-Tayyib, the regime's deputy prime minister and their previous ally. The obstacle that al-Turabi and his supporters perceived in the way of their plans was their allies the Arabs, who were and still are urging Numayri not to tolerate anyone at his side. In order to avoid this same pitfall, they worked diligently and covertly to replace their allies the Arabs with Khomeyni's Iran. In order to cover up this change smoothly, they put the regime in a hole regarding the decrees it produced, losing it the majority of its allies and putting it on a path that could only lead to Tehran.

Al-Turabi moved to induce the regime to go to Khomeyni's table. Al-Turabi and his supporters in Tehran succeeded in obtaining a shipment of Iranian oil for Sudan. However, the same ship, carrying al-Turabi's bribe to the regime, was stuck at the foot of the Arab Gulf with scores of its fellow ships, in addition to the large number of similar ships that have been smashed by Iraqi naval units and aircraft blockading the Iranian island of Kharg. All this was at the same time, or to be more precise, some time before al-Turabi and his supporters began the most dangerous phase in their alliance with Khomeyni, the phase directly tied to their plans for autocracy in Sudan.

Al-Turabi and his supporters in Sudan, over a long period of time, had infiltrated into the country and nearby large quantities of arms and ammunition from Iran. They customarily used their positions in the regime to bring batches of these weapons through Port Sudan. Then they would be shipped by train, and in a station close to Khartoum, they would be received and merchandise would be substituted in their place. This job was done naturally and with sufficient cover, until some workers in the State Security Agency in Sudan, last July, discovered a shipment of these arms after Dr al-Tijani Abu Judayri was in a traffic accident that led to his death. He was en route to arrange delivery of the weapons.

So far it is clear to the regime's security authorities that the confiscated arms were from Iran and also that they were mixed in with packages of merchandise being shipped to Dr al-Tijani Abu Judayri. The latter was the official responsible for foreign relations for the Brotherhood and represented them in the Brotherhood's international movement in Geneva. He had spent a long time in America and visited it frequently. He was one of his organization's cadre in the student movement and one of its representatives in the National Front. He had previously worked on the board of a research station for the Agricultural Research Commission and had taught in the university. He was also well-known in Sudanese political circles for his connections with his organization's military activities, whether training within the country or supervising the sending of trainees to their military camps in Libya by way of Nigeria, in accordance with arrangements between Tehran, al-Qadhdhafi and his organization.

We must refer to the fact that al-Turabi and his supporters had, for some time, used the pulpits of the regime's rightwing press in London to attack the regime's allies in the West and in the region, by preaching the possibility of an alliance between the regime and Tehran. This was the reverse of the part role of al-Turabi and his group in Sudan. As regards the attempts to improve the Numayri regime's relations with Tehran, this was tied in with the interests of their organization, a matter which, at the same time, also indicates the dangerous stages in the Brotherhood's plans to exploit their conciliation with the regime in preparing to take control of it from within.

It is currently difficult to predict which direction the regime will go concerning al-Turabi's slip so close to Khartoum and the exposure of his armed plans. That will depend on the extent of some of its staff's involvement, especially its security agency, in the Brotherhood's plans.

7005

CSO: 4504/446

## BRIEFS

COTTON SALE TO ETHIOPIA--AL-MAJALLAH has learned that Israel recently concluded a deal with Ethiopia for the sale of Israeli cotton produced in the Negev Desert. The cotton will be sold through the London branch of an Israeli company. The deal is worth \$20 million and the cotton has been exported from the Israeli port of Elat to the port of Aseb in Ethiopia. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 239, 8-14 Sep 84 p 3]

CSO: 4400/1

ISRAEL SEEN TRYING TO ISOLATE SOUTHERN LEBANON

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 391, 18 Aug 84 pp 30-31

[Article by 'Imad Jawdiyah: "International Peacekeeping Force Official Gives AL-MUSTAQBAL Important Information: Israel Has Begun Geographically Isolating the Population of the Occupied South"]

[Text] The Israeli occupation forces will begin a partial withdrawal to the Litani, and will set up three areas, one controlled by the Christian militias, another controlled by the Islamic militias, and a third controlled by the militias of the Army of Southern Lebanon. To further their nibbling away at the border strip, the occupation forces have built themselves a military airport on the plains near the town of al-Khayyam, and are currently building a port on the coast near the town of al-Naqurah. They have also recently given Israeli identity cards to the residents of this area.

Anyone who is keeping an eye on what Israeli is doing in occupied southern Lebanon will have noticed that Israel, through its increasingly despotic measures, is treating that area's residents the same way it treats the West Bank population, with complete indifference for international law or humane practices. The number of "Ansar" being detained, the police raids, and the serious, wholesale destruction of the southern economy, is increasing day by day. Agricultural production has been undermined, and industrial production has come to a virtual standstill, because Israel is bringing in its own commodities and is preventing raw materials from reaching the south for processing. Furthermore, roads have been closed and transportation obstructed, which has raised transportation costs so much that all Lebanese agricultural production is threatened. Southern Lebanon exports more than 75 percent of its products to other parts of Lebanon and overseas, and this has become extremely difficult and costly.

What AL-MUSTAQBAL was told by southern leaders during our recent visit to the occupied areas is even more serious. These leaders feel that the road network which the occupying forces have built in certain southern areas may bring about the demographic and geographic isolation of the region's population. These leaders stress that Israel is getting ready for a partial withdrawal to the Litani in early October, after having equipped the Army of Southern Lebanon quite well from the standpoint of numbers and equipment.



Israel's plan to create a demographic vacuum is aimed at causing wide-scale emigration from some southern areas, similar to what happened in the Jabal, and setting up demarcation lines between three areas which Israel wants to establish as follows:

1. An area stretching from the villages in the al-Kharrub coastal area to Jezzine District, to be controlled by the Christian militias, with its own port at al-Jayyah;
2. An area including Sayda, al-Zahrani, Sur, and al-Nabatiyah Districts, to be controlled by the Shi'ite-Sunni militias, with ports at Sayda and Sur; and
3. The border strip, or the "State of South Lebanon," including Marj 'Uyun Hasbaya, al-Khayyam, Bint Jubayl and al-Naqurah, to be controlled by the Antoine Lahd militias, which are divided along sectarian lines as follows:  
20 percent Shi'ite, 15 percent Druze, 5 percent Sunni, and 60 percent Christian.

The southern leaders told AL-MUSTAQBAL that Israel is nibbling away at the border strip and trying to annex it, and is treating this area quite differently from the other southern areas it occupied in June 1982. For example, these villages still have "National Guard" posts which were set up in 1978, and members of this guard, under direct orders from the Israeli forces command, still collect taxes and duties from the inhabitants of the strip, who are allowed, to the exclusion of all others, to work on Israeli farms and factories, and to serve as doctors in Israeli hospitals, especially the Safad Hospital.

The occupation forces still mobilize night guards from among the inhabitants, without any justification, and just recently built three barracks for the Army of Southern Lebanon, one in the village of Hawla, a second at the Bint Jubayl-Marun al-Ra's road intersection, and the third near Kafr Kalla. They also built a military airport on the al-Khayyam plain, and are now building a port on the coast at al-Naqurah, near the International Peacekeeping Forces command. They have also distributed Israeli identification cards in Arabic and English, bearing the name "State of Southern Lebanon", to the inhabitants of the border strip.

AL-MUSTAQBAL learned all of this from a high-placed source in the International Peacekeeping Forces during his recent visit to Beirut. This source also revealed that Israel's intention behind all these plans was to upset the peace in Beirut and to keep the Lebanese domestic situation fragmented, so as to make it easy for Israel to nibble away at as much southern Lebanese territory as possible.

8559

CSO: 4404/636

AL-HUSS DISCUSSES EDUCATION, TALKS WITH PHALANGISTS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 391, 18 Aug 84 pp 32-33

[Interview with Dr Salim al-Huss, minister of education and labor, by 'Imad Jawdiyah/

[Text] Interviewing Lebanese Minister of Education and Labor Dr Salim al-Huss is particularly important, because the man holds two of the most important ministerial portfolios. He has therefore been concerned with the problems of both ever since 1975, and is working to reorganize their operations as well as following the country's political affairs. He is one of the leaders of the "National Unity" government, and some official circles consider him a candidate for a major role in the "constitutional authority," the formation of which is being discussed, and which would draw up a new constitution for Lebanon.

[Question] Like everything else in Lebanon, the educational situation is a victim of the war and its tragedies. This has led to a decline in the level of education and to a certain loss of confidence in the Lebanese diploma overseas. What is your evaluation of the educational situation in Lebanon, after 10 years of war? What steps will you take to restore it to its previous level? What do you think of its future, especially now that you are re-examining the existing educational system?

[Answer] I for one say that the excellence which had characterized Lebanon in various areas was the major victim of the Lebanese war. For example, the standard of living dropped sharply, production dropped, unemployment became aggravated, and prices rose. All of these categories had been indices of the excellent standard of living which the Lebanese had enjoyed before the war.

To a certain extent, moral standards were also victims of this war. After many years of suffering and hardship, some Lebanese began to think that it was all right to infringe on the rights, and in many cases on the lives, of others. Many people lost any real sense of obligation to respect private property, since scores of automobiles are stolen each day and hundreds of flats and houses are occupied by others than their owners. While it is acknowledged that what started this wave of appropriating other people's property was the refugee problem, and in this sense, the party responsible for this phenomenon is not the unfortunate needy person but is everyone who participated in his forcible expulsion from his home, his region or from his way of life, in any case, the result is the same. Among all the areas which fell victim to the war and its tragedies, the cultural level in general and

education in particular stands out. In its broadest sense, culture was Lebanon's most glorious aspect, and if Lebanon was proud of anything, it was proud of being a meeting point for many cultures, an arena for their interaction, and a podium for their utilization throughout the Arab world. Today we see that Lebanon's cultural facets have become noticeably limited, especially in publishing, artistic production, intellectual creativity, and so forth. Education has not been spared; all during the incidents, how many students found themselves out on the streets for long periods of time, without any schools to go to? How many have found themselves driven to bear arms, and crouch in trenches, for the sake of a cause which they might or might not understand? How can they give their undivided attention to all aspects of everyday student life, to gaining knowledge and pursuing their studies, when they are exposed to maltreatment from Israel and its agents in the south, for example, or to boundless surprises, including death beneath the rubble of the buildings where they lived because of a fragmentation bomb?

So it went for the young people of Beirut during the long siege of the summer of 1982. Or, what about the young people of the Jabal, for example, cut off from the rest of the country for long periods of time because of the state of siege and the fighting around them? Or, what can we say about the victims who lack even the minimum requirements for a decent life, when we see some of them dressed in rags and some of them without even a morsel to keep body and soul together?

None of these factors, which naturally vary from time to time, from region to region, and from group to group, guarantee the maintenance of a high standard of education, no matter how hard we try. In other words, the standard of education, just like other standards in Lebanon, has paid the price of the incidents. As for the future of education, it is our opinion that the problem must be treated at its very roots. Security and stability must be restored throughout Lebanon, in the context of true national accord, so that the student will be able to perform his duties fully, and so that the state can re-examine the curricula and the educational system. Our long-range goal, as stated in the ministerial statement which basically gave a vote of confidence to the National Unity government, is the development of the curricula in such a way as to ensure the unity of Lebanon, its people and its Arabism, in addition to the provision of universal, compulsory, free education.

[Question] Let us move on from the Education Ministry's affairs to those of the Labor Ministry. What are the basic features of the "new system" for work permits, which you are now preparing, with respect to Palestinians resident in Lebanon since 1948 who carry provisional citizenship being treated the same as the Lebanese?

[Answer] Right now we are drawing up a new system for work permits, aimed at increasing the department's efficiency in reviewing and issuing work permits, on the one hand, and establishing just, impartial, clear guidelines for work permit applicants on the other hand. In this respect, our approach calls for treating any resident of Lebanon who has no other residence in another country the same as the Lebanese, and this particularly applies to those Palestinians who have lived in Lebanon since 1948, and whose residence can be proven by UNRWA records. It also applies to those who have lived in Lebanon

for many years who have not been granted Lebanese citizenship and who still carry a document classifying them as under study. Exceptions would be made in the case of particular laws which might differ from this one, such as laws regulating the practice of certain professions; if these laws grant Lebanese citizenship after 10 years, as is the case with some professions and activities, then the Labor Ministry will have to abide by these laws.

[Question] After your first appointment to represent Lebanon at the Arab foreign ministers' conference held in Tunis recently, and your re-appointment to represent Lebanon at the coming conference, have some circles come to indirectly consider you foreign minister as well as minister of labor and education?

[Answer] Prime Minister Karami is the foreign minister, and I confidently and sincerely believe that he is the man of the hour. He is both prime minister and foreign minister in view of his qualifications for these positions, which are extremely influential in view of the extraordinary circumstances under which we live. My appointment to represent Lebanon at the Arab foreign ministers' conference in Tunis, and my re-appointment to head the Lebanese delegation to the next foreign ministers' conference, are due to Prime Minister Karami's dedication to the affairs of government. Under such critical conditions, I feel that my appointment to this post is an indication of Prime Minister Karami's confidence in me personally.

[Question] Getting away from ministerial concerns, what is the nature of your weekly meetings at the Republican Palace with Phalangist and National Liberal Party Representatives Joseph Abu-Khalil and Marun Hilu, which President Amin al-Jumayyil also attends? Are these meetings being held to draw up and discuss a draft for an accord, so as to present it to the "constitutional authority," which will draw up a new constitution for the country? Are the Islamic parties represented in this discussion, as some people say?

[Answer] These weekly meetings with Joseph Abu-Khalil of the Phalangist Party and Marun Hilu of the National Liberal Party, both of whom accompanied their party leaders to the Geneva and the Lausanne Conferences, were the idea of president of the republic. . He addressed us as follows: "The Christian side, as represented by the parties of the 'Lebanese Front,' needs to listen to the Moslem point of view on various subjects, just as you (and here he was addressing me personally) must take care to find out the actual Christian viewpoint on various timely issues." President Amin al-Jumayyil suggested these meetings, and I agreed, but from the beginning I was perfectly frank with the other participants, saying that I was prepared to enter into a frank, open discussion about the background of the political and national situation, and to discuss various fundamental issues which would help illuminate the true positions of the various parties, so as to facilitate any accord dialogs which the government might initiate in the near future. I also indicated my complete readiness to discuss the dialog's agenda, so as to outline its procedures and working methods, and to come to some agreement which would ensure that the dialog is properly conducted and true national accord is ultimately achieved.

On the other hand, I was perfectly frank in saying that I was not ready to enter into any arrangements over certain basic issues, because I fully realized that I did not represent all the Moslems and that my colleagues at the meetings did not represent all the Christians. Basically, I was and still am the last person to take part in any sectarian arrangements, and I am delicately avoiding giving the outside world any cause for any people, be they malicious or friendly, to think that I was a party to a Sunni-Maronite arrangement which would only stir up the allies without bearing any real fruit.

This reminds me of something Karim Baqraduni once said, which goes to the heart of bipartisan arrangements: "The events of 1860 ended with a Maronite-Druze settlement, the events of 1943 ended with a Maronite-Sunni arrangement, and the events of 1975 have to end with a Maronite-Shi'ite settlement." Afterwards, he went back and amended it to a non-Shi'ite one. I am the last man to enter into such a sectarian settlement, especially a bipartisan one in which I can see only harm, damage, ruin and discord.

The time has not yet come to go into all the details of the open, constructive dialog between myself and the president of the republic, along with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and Camille Sham'un. It will suffice to say that this ongoing dialog is characterized by positive thinking and openness, and I feel that it will be very beneficial. All I can say is that the subjects which I have brought up so far, on which we all agree, depend first of all on the methodology of the dialog which is so necessary for the attainment of the desired national accord, and secondly on general national issues related to Lebanon's identity, nature and mission.

8559

CSO: 4404/636



## RAMA RAO CALLED 'ANTINATIONALIST' 'CIA AGENT'

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 6 Sep 84 p 4

[Text]

Hyderabad, Sept. 5: Mr Goverdhan Reddy, Congress(I) MLA, today accused the dismissed chief minister, Mr N.T. Rama Rao of being "anti-national" and a "CIA agent." Speaking at a press conference held in the Legislative Council office of Mr Krosaiiah, Congress(I) leader of the opposition, Mr Reddy said the nation was "in great danger" from Mr Rama Rao, who was "playing into the hands of foreign countries who wanted to destroy Indian democracy."

On being questioned, he identified the countries as the United States, Pakistan and China. Though Mr Goverdhan Reddy is not known for his tact and is sometimes not taken seriously even by his own partymen, his accusation coming soon after a similar charge by the chief minister, Mr N. Bhaskara Rao, indicates a concerted move to

malign Mr Rama Rao.

A few days earlier, Mr Bhaskara Rao had accused Mr Rama Rao of being a "traitor" and "having links with some foreign country." He, however, did not identify the country, during a speech at a public meeting in Secunderabad.

Mr Reddy said Mr Rama Rao had tried to meet the US President, the secretary of state and the CIA director during his visit to the US in June this year. He also said Mr Rama Rao was contacting Pakistan "through his close association with the former Jammu and Kashmir chief minister, Dr Farooq Abdullah."

He claimed that foreign nationals were present at the Ramakrishna Cine Studios when the MLAs were staying there, but later stated he did not know whether they were there now, or not.

CSO: 4600/1181

## G. K. REDDY COMMENTS ON ANDHRA PRADESH CRISIS

Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text] NEW DELHI, Sept. 4--The Centre has nudged the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Mr. N. Bhaskara Rao, to face the Assembly next week, without dragging his feet any longer, since he was becoming a major embarrassment to the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in meeting the Opposition threat to launch a countrywide agitation against the inordinate delay in convening the promised session to test his strength on the floor of the House.

The Prime Minister herself had intervened to get the message across to Mr. Bhaskara Rao that he could not afford to dodge this responsibility without compelling the Congress (I) to reconsider its position since as the ruling party of the Centre, it had to view the Andhra problem in a wider perspective in terms of its own political interests.

There was considerable relief in Congress (I) circles that, in the wake of the announcement from Hyderabad that the Assembly had been summoned to meet on September 11, the Opposition parties dropped their plans for a big rally tomorrow at the Boat Club near Parliament House in Delhi, followed by a march to the Prime Minister's residence to offer dharna and court arrest demanding an early session of the Assembly.

The action programme included similar marches in the State capitals and demonstrations at district headquarters all over the country to display their all-out support for the dismissed Chief Minister, Mr. N. T. Rama Rao, in his confrontation with the Centre.

But the leaders of the 18 Opposition parties which took this decision after hurried consultations did not abandon the idea of the proposed one-day Bharat bandh at a later date, since they wanted to wait and see whether there would be a fair trial of strength when the Assembly was called upon to vote on a motion of confidence in the new Government. They intend to revive the idea of a countrywide agitation if any undue pressure is exerted on the Telegu Desam MLAs to tilt the balance in Mr. Bhaskara Rao's favour through last-minute defections.

15 will tilt balance: According to the latest information available in Delhi, Mr. Bhaskara Rao is counting on the support of at least 72 Telugu Desam

members, besides 57 Congress (I) MLAs, five Majlis members, two belonging to the Rashtriya Sanjay Manch and four independents, a total of 140 in the 295-member Assembly, and he is hoping to wean away with Congress (I) help another 10 to 15 members to establish his majority in the House.

Though the deposed Chief Minister is claiming the support of not less than 160, Central agencies believe that at least 140 of them would stand by him, barring some last-minute defections. These include 19 members belonging to other Opposition parties now supporting him.

So the battle for power in Andhra Pradesh during the next few days boils down to a tug-of-war between the two rival groups for the support of some 20 pliable members belonging to the Telugu Desam, who might change sides under pressure, persuasion or temptation. The new Chief Minister continues to exude confidence, assuring his mentors in Delhi that he would be able to prove his majority on the floor of the House. But the Congress (I) leaders, who are not too sure that he would be able to do so on his own, have taken upon themselves to assist Mr. Bhaskara Rao actively in weaning away 15 to 20 members from NTR's camp to tilt the balance.

It is going to be a no-holds-barred exercise, reducing Indian politics to a new low, with an all-out attempt to buy MLAs with money or offers of minister-ships to win this gamble at any cost irrespective of the consequences. The NTR camp also is not short of funds, if it comes to paying the market price for retaining the support of some of these doubtful members who are open to the highest bid from either side.

Principal villain: It is difficult to visualise at this stage the outcome of this squalid rivalry, but whoever wins or loses the Congress (I) is going to tarnish its reputation by unnecessarily casting itself in the role of a principal villain with Mr. Bhaskara Rao as only a pawn in this toppling operation. But the said part of it all is that in projecting himself as a victim of the Congress (I)'s machinations, NTR has not crowned himself with glory by keeping his followers under close surveillance outside the State.

The Prime Minister called on the President, Mr. Zail Singh, later this evening to tell him that she had taken steps to see that the Assembly was convened soon. During her last meeting with him, Mr. Zail Singh had expressed his unhappiness over the hasty manner in which the former Governor, Mr. Ram Lal, had installed the new Government.

The President's unhappiness, privately expressed in his personal capacity without bringing in his own constitutional role, was one of the factors that led to the decision to ask Mr. Ram Lal to submit his resignation. But the way the Congress (I) subsequently took upon itself to sustain Mr. Bhaskara Rao in power at any cost took away much of the grace from this decision.

Damage to democracy: This is a messy business which has already done a lot of damage to India's democracy by projecting the country's leaders and elected representatives, whatever their political persuasions, as persons without integrity, character or conscience who would do anything for the sake of the spoils of office. And it is going to take them a long time to live down this stigma and prove worthy of the people's trust again.

## DISMISSED TAMIL NADU MINISTER FORMS OWN PARTY

Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Sep 84 p 1

[Text]

MADRAS, Sept. 5.

Mr. S. D. Somasundaram, who was dismissed from the AIADMK Ministry, led by Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, today launched his own political party, the Anna Dravide Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK).

Amidst ovation Mr. Somasundaram hoisted the new party's flag — black, white and red in equal width — outside his small house in CIT Colony, Nandanam, and appealed to his supporters, who had collected there since morning, to sustain the movement against corruption in public life.

**Principles ignored:** Addressing a news conference earlier, Mr. Somasundaram claimed that the name he had chosen for his "regional party" signified the revival of the spirit of courage, sacrifice and sense of purpose, witnessed when "we broke away from the DMK in 1972, protesting against corruption" to launch the Anna DMK.

Mr. Ramachandran changed the name to All-India Anna DMK (AIADMK) later, to make the party appear to have an all-India character, to hoodwink the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her Congress (I). "With that Annadurai's principles were thrown to the winds", he said.

Displaying the flag, Mr. Somasundaram explained that the black on top symbolised the social evils confronting the people, the red at the bottom indicated the revolutionary spirit to fight those evils, and the white in the middle highlighted the importance of purity in public life.

**Democratic party:** A tired-looking Mr. Somasundaram said that a committee would be set up shortly to enunciate the policies and programmes of his party. "We will uphold Anna's social, economic and political principles in building a casteless, classless, rationalist and progressive society on democratic lines", he said, and repeated the word "democratic", saying, "MGR does not like this".

Mr. Somasundaram announced the appointment of Mr. Sennimalai alias P. S. Kandasamy, MLA, as the State Organising Secretary of the party. Asked about his own position in the party, Mr. Somasundaram said, "I will remain an ordinary worker".

Among those who announced quitting the AIADMK and joining the new party at the time of its launching were Mr. C. Ramanathan and Mr. P. G. Kittu, former MLAs from Vridhachalam and Palladam respectively, and Mr. R. D. Ranganathan, Vridhachalam town secretary of the AIADMK.

**New conspiracy:** The former Minister, who was dismissed from the Cabinet and expelled from the AIADMK a couple of days ago, spoke of a "new conspiracy" to foist criminal cases against him.

He had received information about the attempts to "plant five boxes, each containing Rs. 15 lakhs in the house of any one of my supporters". The idea was to arrest that person and then extract from him statements "to make out that the money belonged to me", Mr. Somasundaram said and warned his supporters to beware of strangers and not to let into their houses persons carrying boxes.

CSO: 4600/1176

## CONGRESS-I CLAIMS PAKISTAN HELPED SIKH DISSIDENTS

Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Sep 84 p 6

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 5.

Pakistan's plans to promote secessionist trends among the Sikhs and its calculated moves to woo Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, self-styled leader of the Khalistan movement, and Mr. Ganga Singh Dhillon, India-born American national and protagonist of the Sikh "nation" theory, are detailed in the latest publication of the Congress (I).

The story of Pakistan's contacts with these two Sikhs, living abroad, is narrated at a time when there is ample evidence of Islamabad's interest in the "Sikh problem."

After recalling the happenings during the 1971 India-Pakistan war—release by the Lahore radio of Chauhan manifesto for the "republic of Khalistan," presentation to Chauhan of the keys of Nankana Sahib, the gurdwara at the birth-place of Guru Nank, near Lahore, by the then Pakistani President, Gen. Yahya Khan—the publication recounts the visits to Pakistan by Chauhan and Dhillon in the last five years.

It says: "Both Chauhan and Ganga Singh Dhillon visited Pakistan in January 1979 and established strong ties with Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. Contacts were then developed and maintained regularly. The self-proclaimed "Khalistan" leaders were entertained by Iftiqar Ahmed Ansari, Pakistan Minister for Religious and Minorities Affairs and Chaudhury Zahur Elahi (a close friend and trusted adviser of Gen. Zia), who, till his assassination by the Al-Zulfikar held out a helping hand to the "Khalistan" cause, pledging full Pakistani support to the Akalis. Another Pakistani leader, Mian Mohammed Shafi, who hails from Jalandhar and is a friend of Chauhan, kept in touch with the "Khalistan" leaders.

"Ganga Singh Dhillon visited Pakistan several times (September-October 1979, April 1980, March 1981, November-December 1981, May 1982 and November 1983). He had been meeting Gen. Zia and he praised the Pakistan President for "showing the way". The fact that Begum Zia and Mrs. Dhillon were both of Kenyan origin and had known each other since childhood helped to keep Gen. Zia and Dhillon together."

Noting that the "Khalistan" movement has been able to make headway in the U.K., U.S., West Germany and Canada, the publication re-

fers to liberal flow of funds to "Khalistan" leaders from "various official and non-official sources in the U.S. and Pakistan." Special mention is made of the Zurich branch of the Pakistani Habib Bank giving large sums of money to "Khalistan" representatives. Such funds were eventually siphoned off to India through trusted carriers.

**Settling scores**

According to the publication Pakistani businessmen living in the U.K. were ever ready to advance loans to the Sikh militants who had their regular links with Britain, West Germany, Canada and the U.S. Similar generosity was shown by Pakistani Kashmiris living in London. The Pakistanis would say openly that by helping the Sikh secessionists they were settling the 1971 score with India.

"Pakistani officials and members of the Pakistani diplomatic corps in its missions abroad maintained regular contacts with the 'Khalistani' Sikhs and the Sikh militant groups who roamed around the world to elicit support, spread their propaganda and collect funds. It was known that Gen. (ret'd) Chishti of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference and Amanullah Khan of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front had regular meetings with Chauhan. The Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami and the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir groups having intimate associations with some of the organisations in Jammu and Kashmir were providing funds to the Sikh terrorists in Punjab. No wonder, Rajinder Singh of the 'Khalistan information centre' which operates in West Germany had warned in the 'Sikh Youth International,' a publication of the centre: "The day the Sikhs rise in Punjab, Pakistan will invade Kashmir." The 'Khalistan' Sikhs had been holding out threats that Punjab would become the 'Ireland of Asia'."

Mentioning the oath of self-sacrifice, taken by 151 Muslim volunteers, along with the Akalis on May 11, 1983 in the Golden Temple to serve the Sikh Panth, the publication quoted Dhillon as having written in a pamphlet, "Janamsthan," published by Sri Nankana Sahib Foundation in Washington, about the cooperation between the Muslims and Sikhs: "The entire history of Sikhism is interlaced with Muslim personalities and their cooperation resulting from mutual respect."



POLL PANEL PREPARING FOR ELECTIONS ON SCHEDULE

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 6 Sep 84 p 9

[Text] NEW DELHI, Sept. 5--Contrary to the continuing speculation on the date of the next Lok Sabha poll, the Election Commission is understood to be proceeding on the assumption that the poll will be held in the normal course.

What this means is that it will have to be held in the first week of January--since the new Lok Sabha has to be constituted on January 20, 1985 and since, prior to that date, at least a week's time would be required for counting of votes and another week for summoning new members. The consensus among Chief Electoral Officers of States and Union Territories who met here in the middle of last month was also that the first week of January, or the second week of December, would be suitable for holding the election.

The Election Commission is already seized of this matter, although, as far as can be checked, it has not yet applied its mind to the question of a precise date for the poll.

Is postponement of the election beyond January possible?

Sources close to the Election Commission suggest that, under Article 352 of the Constitution as tightened by the 44th Amendment in 1978, it is virtually unthinkable.

Only a grave emergency, caused by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, and a consequential presidential proclamation to that effect can interfere with the normal process of election. Besides Article 352 stipulates that any such proclamation will lapse, if it is not tabled within a month in both Houses of Parliament and approved by them through appropriate resolutions.

That, again, according to these sources, makes a postponment of the Lok Sabha election highly implausible.

CSO: 4600/1174

## ANALYST DISCUSSES GANDHI GOVERNING STYLE

Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Sep 84 p 9

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 5.

The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, is working on a mini Cabinet reshuffle at the Centre to fill the existing vacancies by reallocating the portfolios of some of her colleagues in an interim arrangement until the Parliamentary elections.

There are two important vacancies at present with no Cabinet rank Ministers in charge of the Ministries of Industry and Commerce, following the reassignment of Mr. N. D. Tiwari as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and Mr. V. P. Singh as President of the party organisation in the State.

At one stage Mrs. Gandhi thought of inducting a couple of prominent State leaders into the Central Cabinet to fill these vacancies, but she gave up the idea subsequently since any such stop-gap arrangement for entrusting these economic portfolios to entirely new and untried men even for a few months would have been quite unsatisfactory, to say the least.

So the Prime Minister seemed to have veered round to the view that it would be more desirable to entrust them to existing Ministers with some knowledge of higher economic administration, although it would involve consequential changes on a relatively larger scale than required in this limited situation. It is for this reason that she has not been able to make up her mind about the nature or extent of the changes of portfolios to be made in the course of this mini reshuffle, even if she has no intention of inducting any new faces into her Cabinet at this late stage.

**Unsatisfactory arrangement:** After Mr. N. D. Tiwari moved over to Lucknow, Mrs. Gandhi entrusted the Industry portfolio temporarily as an additional charge to the Commerce Minister, Mr. V. P. Singh, until he himself assumed charge of his new party assignment at the end of Parliament session. Though he has relinquished charge of both the portfolios

and left Delhi, no alternative arrangements have yet been made to allocate these two key portfolios to other Ministers until the Lok Sabha elections.

As a decision cannot be delayed any longer, an announcement is expected in the next few days after Mrs. Gandhi has made up her mind about the proposed changes. At one stage she was inclined to tag on these two ministries to some other Ministers as additional charges, but she was told by her advisers that it will be a highly unsatisfactory arrangement, since the country was passing through a difficult economic period causing considerable anxiety over the price situation.

In her style of functioning, there is no finality about what she intends to do until a formal announcement is made, whether it is in relation to Cabinet changes or administrative decisions. So even those who are very close to her have no clear idea of what she is going to do other than the bare fact that she is no longer thinking of inducting any new faces in before the elections.

**Andhra affair, eye-opener:** A more important development than the impending reshuffle is the attempt being made by Mrs. Gandhi behind the scenes to enforce some degree of discipline within her own entourage, since she has realised that a lot of harm was being done by the over-zealous actions of those acting in her name, whether it is in regard to party matters or the activities of the Government. The Andhra episode came as an eye-opener to her of the wider ramifications of extra constitutionality in the management of the party organisation or the functioning of the Government.

Though everybody knows that the whole toppling operation was manipulated from Delhi, nobody is coming forward to own responsibility for acting in such a precipitous manner with indecent haste. Almost all those actively involved in this shocking episode are now feigning innocence and pretending that they had no hand in it.

## COMMERCE MINISTRY: INDIA OPPOSED TO NEW GATT ROUND

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 7 Sep 84 p 9

[Text] NEW DELHI, Sept. 6--India is opposed to a move made by the USA and Japan for a new round of negotiations under the Generalized Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Instead, it wants all parties concerned to fulfil previously accepted commitments and the implementation of commitments made in the ministerial declaration two years ago when the talks in Tokyo ended.

According to the Commerce Ministry sources, a new round of negotiations is not the answer to the dilution of principles of multilateralism already accepted and the erosion of such accepted pacts like the most favoured nation agreement and preferential treatment of developing countries.

What is needed, now that the world economy is showing signs of revival, is for the industrialized countries to roll back the departures they have made from multilateralism and to withdraw the protective measures introduced by them.

India feels that the developed countries should implement promptly their undertaking to lift measures inconsistent with the GATT which restricts the exports of developing countries and refrains from introducing new ones.

They should exercise the utmost restraint in countervailing anti-dumping procedures against imports from developing countries. They should take immediate steps to liberalize their import regime for textiles and clothing and restore the GATT discipline in this sector.

India has suggested that the industrialized countries should engage in serious efforts to implement the GATT work programme of particular interest to the trade of developing countries which was adopted at the ministerial-level meeting in November, 1982.

India is apprehensive that a new round of negotiations at this stage will divert attention from implementing the GATT work programme and bring to the negotiating table such new issues as services (like banking and insurance) which are presently outside the GATT.

CSO: 4600/1178

## HOME MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DISCUSSES PLANS FOR PUNJAB

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 7 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI, Sept. 6--The Centre has not yet decided on the restoration of a popular Government in Punjab, a spokesman of the Union Home Ministry stated today, pointing out that the reports from Jabalpur quoting the Home Minister, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao in this connexion were "factually incorrect". (The Jabalpur report quoted Mr Rao as having said that a popular Government would be installed in Punjab).

According to the spokesman, President's rule in the State is due to expire on October 6, and if the situation so warranted, its term might be extended for a further six months. For this purpose, an amendment to the Constitution had already been made.

A senior Congress (I) leader from Punjab, Mr Jagdev Singh Jassowal, MLA, and chairman of the Punjab Forest Development Corporation, met the Prime Minister this morning and submitted to her a detailed note and discussed the Punjab situation with her.

Mr Jassowal said in a statement to the Press later that the Akalis should avoid a confrontation with the Government and understand that much damage had been done to the community because of their follies and narrow opportunistic politics."

## Extremists

He said that as a devout Sikh, "we are equally keen that 'irritants' relating to religion should be removed as early as possible, the Golden Temple's 'honour' restored and the BSF unit posted inside the complex withdrawn." The only cause of concern at the moment was that the "temple complex was not exploited again for political purposes and by antisocial elements and extremists".

Mr Jassowal said that in the Nehru-Tara Singh pact, it had been envisaged that the SGPC would confine itself to gurdwara management and religious preaching and the Akali Dal would have no role as a political party. Subsequently, under the presidentship of Master Tara Singh, the general body of the Akali Dal had amended its constitution in order to ensure that in future, the Dal joined the national mainstream and followed all political programmes of the Congress.

After that resolution had been adopted, the Akali Dal members had contested the elections on Congress tickets.

Mr Jassowal asked the Akalis to go in for "some introspection" and recall the Akali Dal's own decision that MLAs and M.P.s not be allowed to become members of the SGPC. The Akali Dal should ask itself why subsequently "the whole process was reversed and how the confused Akali Dal leadership has by proxy exploited the authority of the five high priests".

CSO: 4600/1178



## DEFENSE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT SAID READY FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 5 Sep 84 p 4

[Article by M.R. John]

[Text]

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is all set to step into the arena of high cost high technology. It yearns to raise the country up to the level of the world's most technologically advanced. It aims at self-reliance in high technology weapon systems and laments why time was allowed to run out for all these years since Independence.

A sense of urgency and an equal measure of despondency appear to have overwhelmed it as revealed in the expressions: "This is perhaps the nation's last opportunity to close the technology gap in the high technology defence systems".

All well-wishers of this country would wish the DRDO well in this resolution. The nation's last opportunity must not be lost. We look forward to actualisation of its impressive projections. The nation as a whole may not turn to only the DRDO as some DRDO officials think "it will have to", but it will certainly watch with interest how "the destiny of the country as a free and independent nation may perhaps be linked to our ability to pull together as an organisation and focus coherently on a new configuration which can effectively deal with all the problems of the day".

Incidentally, a level of cynicism also creeps in because the DRDO is known for receiving benefits from foreign technological advances in its role of dealing with scientific problems in defence matters.

The present DRDO has grown to 42 research laboratories scattered all over the country with several thousand scientists working in it from a meagre strength of only 15 scientists in November 1949, then collected for research at Delhi's Metcalfe House. And yet it has not earned much by way of reputation either in the country's armed forces or the Ministry of Defence.

It is very likely individual scientists or laboratories might have been doing creative work of good quality, but the "outsiders" do not get opportunities to know about them. In ignorance we had all along taken the simplistic view that since defence scientists so often protected themselves with "for the reasons of security", they might not be having really much to hide. Wherever there is secrecy, there is bound to be less stress on achievement. Security of secrecy helps DRDO scientists escape public scrutiny.

Moreover, scientific achievements often go to the risk-taker. The DRDO parade-ground culture is hardly an environment for such risks. Scientists say they go about their work as per command of the senior officers. As juniors, they are told by military officers it was not for them to seek to know more or do better than their officers. Their duty consisted in obedience. In the event it is heartening to know that however belated, authorities now realise "the defence laboratories are saturated and not

growing". They have set their mind to change — towards more effective organisation.

Basically they plan to shift from preoccupation with small project to "concentration on high cost high technology inter-laboratory weapon systems programmes". The old projects — "on-going" schemes — are scheduled to be wound up by 1985 end, and after this period of overlap (1980-85), they say, "defence research in India would be working almost entirely in high technology areas". Let us see how they have demarcated the high technology areas.

To qualify as a high technology programme, the proposals must meet certain requirements. First, they should involve several (five or more) major R&D sub-system projects. Secondly, they should be risky and involve work in areas where know-how and know-why is scarce. Thirdly, they should be costly and time consuming. Costs may vary from Rs 300 crore to Rs 1500 crore per programme; time to complete may vary from five to ten years. Fourthly, there should be a prime research and development centre which may be one of the DRDO laboratories or a public sector undertaking.

Other qualifications given are:

1. The work should be highly interdisciplinary and should spread out over several departments of Government and involve massive technology transfer to public sector industry, and to the private sector to an extent.

2. They are vital to national defence in that long-term dependence on foreign supplies for these weapons would be dangerous to national security.

3. They are vital to economic security in that long-term dependence on foreign supplies would create an economic crisis.

4. The technology gap is very wide and the country will be eliminated from the international market scene if these programmes are not taken up.

The first criterion would have sufficed. It is hardly surprising that the latter four have also been deemed as qualifying characteristics; less so for it is a military document (not a science one) prepared by a military officer in the DRDO. The last criterion only a military man can endorse.

Logic is not a privilege of the scientist alone—it has never been. But its complete disregard in the document which has come for circulation through the blessings of the highest quarter in the country's defence science, is certainly an indictment of science in general.

The document relates to management of high technology areas rather than proposals of projects. And management specialists (there are too many these days in defence as elsewhere since such a course is available in-service in the armed forces) are only interested in managing management than processes and products.

The DRDO's operational plan for management of high technology programmes reads as though "the consortium of activities in the laboratories, segments of industries and users, DRDO Hqs, programme management organisations and department of defence research progressively move into the new configuration, the divisional professional bureaucracy which may be named 'Defence Research and Development Agency, (DRDA) .... It is this agency which will undertake inter-departmental high technology programmes with the Department of Defence R&D as a nodal agent. India would then rapidly develop the capacity to close the widening technology gap in defence systems".

It has been, however, conceded: "The present DRDO has no environment of its own and resting on many machine professional bureaucracy always feels drawn to those simple structural forms. In the social context, this configuration is a legitimate tendency but not a legitimate structure. So it is likely to flounder and disintegrate.... The present DRDO configuration is at the edge of a cliff and is just one step away from disintegration due to certain strong pulls".

Coming to what they propose to do in the high cost high technology areas, they have in mind seven new schemes for weapon systems. They, in order of decreasing cost, relate to 1. Combat aircraft; 2. Guided missiles; 3. Combat vehicles; 4. Electronic warfare and communications; 5. Surveillance and detection; 6. Armaments; and 7. Warships. These programmes are proposed to

be carried out simultaneously by 10-15 defence laboratories and two or more major public sector industries.

Certainly a very impressive venture on all counts, but have they done something about them? In the period between March 1982 and March 1984, they say, their attention was focused essentially on only four programmes that fall in the areas. Obviously, they have not done much for the rest.

Only two out of four, they say, have been organised and have taken off. They mean the guided missile project which took off on 23 July, 1983, and the Heavy alloy Penetrator Project (HAP) which took off on 4 March this year. In both, it was "formal take off".

They further say the light combat aircraft (LCA) and advance technology vessels (ATV) projects are on the verge of taking off. In the process of conceptualisation and formalisation of the programme itself (not in really "working out") they have faced numerous difficulties, but these experiences will certainly help them in the take-off of the remaining inter-departmental high technology Defence R&D programmes such as the main battle tank (MBT), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), electronic warfare and communications (EW&C), and surveillance and detection (S&D).

The fact remains that in 1981 the Union Cabinet authorised DRDO to take "a large number of new schemes and the document admits that nearly four years have passed without a systematic and concerted effort, and if this is the nation's last opportunity, as they said, is it not already lost?

In authorisation for "new schemes" they have gone only for high technology weapon systems and they have in mind to concentrate "almost entirely" on these schemes. Have not then the Indian defence science managers, like the armed forces in the country, become infected by the third wave technology?

Both soldiers and scientists must realise that these weapon systems do not always function as they appear to think they do. In movies, soldiers appear more in control of the high technology weapon systems than they could ever be in actual battles. Concentration "almost entirely" in high cost high technology areas does not appear to be either a good "be prepared" stance.

## BRIEFS

NEW AIR CHIEF--NEW DELHI, Sept. 4--Air Chief Marshal L. M. Katre today took over command of the Indian Air Force from Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh at a solemn ceremony at the Air Headquarters here. The 57-year-old new Air Chief, reckoned as one of the best fighter pilots, is the 12th Chief of the Air Staff. The ceremony started at 12-45 p.m. when Air Chief Marshal Katre was ushered into the room of the Chief of the Air Staff. Earlier, he inspected a guard of honour on arrival at the Air Headquarters. Before bidding farewell to Air Headquarters where he had worked for the last three years, Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh inspected a guard of honor. [Text] [Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Sep 84 p 1]

SIKH DESERTERS' TREATMENT--NEW DELHI, Sept. 4--The Supreme Court today issued notice to the Union of India and others on a writ petition from Mr. Khushwant Singh, journalist and MP, complaining of "cruel treatment" of Sikh soldiers who deserted their unit at Ganganagar (Rajasthan) following the Army action at the Golden Temple, Amritsar. The acting Chief Justice, Mr. P. N. Bhagwati, Mr. Justice A. N. Sen and Mr. Justice R. N. Misra were on the bench. The petitioner submitted that he received a letter informing him that the deserters, incarcerated in Rajasthan were being given only one litre of water and no medical assistance. But he could not get the address of the detention camp. The petitioner submitted that even prisoners of war and those detained under valid orders of detention were entitled to human conditions and dignified treatment under articles 14 (equality before law) and 21 of the Constitution (right to live and personal liberty, etc.) [Excerpt] [Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Sep 84 p 9]

CHIEF OF STAFF CHAIRMAN--NEW DELHI, Sept. 5--Admiral [D.] S. Dawson Chief of Naval Staff, today assumed the chairmanship of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Defence Forces. This follows the retirement of Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh from the service yesterday. The Staff Committee is headed by the seniormost service chief. [Text] [Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 6 Sep 84 p 9]

NEW FOREIGN SECRETARY--NEW DELHI, Sept. 6--Mr Romesh Bhandari will be the next Foreign Secretary. He will be succeeding Mr M. K. Rasgotra, who has been given a four-month extension, his third and is due to retire by the end of January. Mr Bhandari takes over on February 1. Mr Bhandari figured very prominently in the recent negotiations in Dubai which resulted in the return

to India of the seven hijackers. This was of course just a dramatic milestone in an otherwise distinguished diplomatic career which Mr Bhandari has had. Mr Bhandari, born in 1928, joined the Foreign Service in 1950 which should in the normal course give him a four-year term as the Foreign Secretary. [Text] [Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 7 Sep 84 p 9]

TAMIL NADU MINISTERS--Madras, Sept. 5 (UNI)--The 23-member Tamil Nadu Cabinet was expanded today with the induction of two ministers. The ministers, Mr. T. Veeraswami and Mr K.K.S.S.R Ramachandran, were administered the oath of office and secrecy by the governor, Mr S.L. Khurana, at Raj Bhavan. The chief minister, Mr M.G. Ramachandran, his Cabinet colleagues and the leader of the Opposition, Mr K.S. Haja Sherif were among those present. Mr. T. Veeraswamy will be incharge of food and Mr Ramachandran Cooperation. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 6 Sep 84 p 5]

JHARKAND PARTY MOVE--Ranchi, Sept. 5--The All-India Jharkhand Party, in a recent resolution, announced that all those who had settled in the tribal belts of West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh before 1951 would be declared Jharkhandis. The Constitution should be suitably amended to delete the word "tribals" for Jharkhandis and the Sixth Schedule should be made applicable to the Jharkhand state, the resolution added. The vice president of the party, Mr Jayant Jaipal Singh, told The Telegraph that this "epoch-making" resolution would clear all misunderstanding among the non-tribals about the proposed Jharkhand state. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 6 Sep 84 p 5]

FOREIGN MINISTRY PANEL--New Delhi, Sept. 6 (PTI)--The reconstituted policy planning committee of the ministry of external affairs will have eight members besides Mr G. Parthasarathy as chairman. The members Mr Ram Niwas Mirdha and Mr A. A. Rahim, two ministers of state in the ministry, Mr R. N. Rao, senior adviser, department of Cabinet affairs, Mr M. Rasgotra, foreign secretary, Mr Romesh Bhandari, secretary (economic relations), Mr K. Natwar Singh, secretary (east) and Mr J.S. Teja, additional secretary (political) in the ministry of external affairs. Mr A.K. Damodaran will be member secretary of the committee. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 6 Sep 84 p 4]

CSO: 4600/1180

IRP ORGAN WARNS GERMANS TO CONSIDER 'MUTUAL INTERESTS'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Jul 84 pp 1, 12

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful, the foreign minister of West Germany, Mr Hans Dietrich Genscher, has arrived in Tehran at the head of a delegation for a state visit. This is actually the first time after the victory of the Islamic revolution that a high-ranking German official at a ministerial level is visiting Iran.

Iran and Germany have an expanded economic relationship which is controlled by two factors that guarantee its healthy expansion. First: Islamic Iran is a revolutionary country which will not be affected by such relations. Second: Germany also is not in a situation to be capable to impose an unhealthy relationship, therefore, it is believed that Mr Genscher's visit can be a suitable background for the officials in Bonn to comprehend most of the facts about the Islamic revolution. But people have the right to know would the German Government, i.e., the same government which followed the American policymakers by participating in the economic blockade of the Islamic revolution, should circumstances necessitate, follow the same policy again, and in order to study German policies do we need to pay attention to the statements made by Washington?

The German Government, i.e., the same government which has treated the Iranian Muslim students viciously and impudently before, would still continue the attitude of annoying the supporters of the Islamic republic? In addition to that, what has changed in the policy which in the simplest words can be described as an attitude coupled with a kind of vengeance and vindictiveness?

So far Bonn has pretended that it is interested in having a strong economic relationship with Islamic Iran, but will this inclination be subject to the national interests of Germany or would the policies outlined by Washington as in the issue of economic blockade have any impact on it.

At that time, with reference to the economic blockade, while following Washington's policies, the European countries indicated that they have been converted into a lever of pressure against oppressed nations, and are obeying Washington as an involuntary instrument, and having realized that Washington does not have an organized and calculated policy, they acted in a different way.



The German policy toward the Islamic revolution has had surprising fluctuations, and it is almost impossible to give a specific definition of Bonn's policy toward a revolution which is called the greatest evolution of the century by Western analysts. It is unlikely that they are unable to understand the qualities of the Islamic revolution, including its unsubmissiveness and encompassing dimensions.

Germany, as one of the economic parties of Iran in Europe, has relatively extensive information about the economic stability and the huge organizing economic power of Iran in the most sensitive historic era of its lifetime, and the Bonn officials can see with their own eyes that even in such destiny-determining and vital moments Islamic Iran has not deviated from its standards and principles.

The Germans cannot expect that the indecent and revengeful behavior of their police and government toward Iranian Muslims will not affect the commercial, economic, industrial and political relations now and in the future.

Today there are some rejected elements in Germany who are playing with the revolution, the human identity and the prestige of a nation. If the Germans are proud of giving refuge to those treacherous elements, they can continue with such a policy. But the officials in Bonn must choose one. Either those elements or the Muslim nation of Iran. They must answer it explicitly so that the authorities of the Islamic Republic can deal with Bonn on the same basis.

There is a difference between giving refuge to a group and taking sides with, or supporting it. It seems there is no need to explain further the behavior of Bonn toward those rejected elements, or on the other hand, the way they have treated the supporters of the Islamic revolution, and the Muslim students in Germany, who have risen from among the masses of the people, and are proceeding and supporting the nation of Iran. We know how they have been bothered and annoyed by the police and other authorities in Germany.

Even though our people do not expect a country which is interested in maintaining good relations with our revolution to give refuge to the enemies of the Islamic revolution, under no circumstances, however, can they agree to see that country taking sides with their enemies and openly supporting them.

In other words, the German Government has not openly adopted an official explicit stand, but practically it has been inclined toward the other side, and this attitude should undoubtedly undergo a change.

Does Mr Genscher know where he is coming to? Does he know who he is talking to? Does Mr Genscher know that the foreign minister of the Islamic republic of Iran represents 36 million revolutionary Muslims when he talks to him and that he expresses the wishes of a nation that proved on the 15th of Khordad, 17th of Shahrivar, and 22d of Bahman that it is always prepared for everything?

Does Mr Genscher know that the minister of foreign affairs represents the very same revolution which brought down the powerful America from the throne of power and trampled on its flag?

As a member of NATO and an official member of the European Common Market, Germany is in a special position that [any] political-economic relationship with it should not be assessed minus the attitudes of those two groups against the Muslims of the world.

In any case, it is obvious that the officials of the Islamic republic will take into consideration all these points in their calculations and relationships. But mentioning these points might be interesting for the guests who might have some other assumptions in mind.

It might be useful to them to repeat that Islamic Iran now is the biggest power of the region and is the anchor of stability in this strategic area of the world. For Islamic Iran its revolution comes first, and it wants everything within the framework of the Islamic identity of this revolution. If we are interested to have a good economic relationship, we will give priority to those who understand our positions in this revolution and have respect for nations.

The German delegation should know that they are hosted by a country in which a great revolution has just changed its image, and this country represents new standards in its relations with others. This is the same revolution which pushed aside America and all the conspirators, and which will be establishing relations with those countries which are pursuing the establishment of healthy, well-defined and definite relations based on mutual interests.

This trip to Tehran might be a good chance to recognize and get familiar with these facts closely, and this is the only way which will make Mr Genscher's visit a successful trip.

12736

CSO: 4640/317

STATEMENT ISSUED ON JORDANIAN-EGYPTIAN TIES

LD271022 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0330 GMT 27 Sep 84

[Text] Following the announcement on the resumption of diplomatic ties between the regimes ruling Jordan and Egypt our country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement, declaring: The Jordanian ruling regime, after 5 years of ostensibly breaking off relations with the Egyptian ruling regime in the wake of the conclusion of Camp David accord and in accordance with the resolutions of the conference of Arab heads, has announced the resumption of official relations with that regime. This resumption of relations, which has such aims as the extension of the Camp David accord, bringing the Egyptian ruling regime out of its isolation and trampling under foot the indubitable rights of the Palestinians and finally confronting the expansion of the Islamic Revolution's movement, is taking place at a time when we are witnessing the consolidation of the links between the Egyptian regime and the new, superficially attractive government occupying Jeru alem, and coincides with suspect trips by the brokers of arrogance and the renewed whisperings about Reagan's forgotten scheme.

Warning the Islamic and Arab governments on the dangerous consequences of this problem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamci Republic of Iran called for a confrontation with this plot since with any lack of such confrontation against it the region would be dragged into compromise with the regime occupying Jerusalem and the United States and, therefore, it is essential that the Moslem and Arab nations, particularly the Moslem Palestine nation, in order to confront this plot and its consequences, should adopt practical and serious measures and should strive toward exposing it.

CSO: 4640/13

## OPPOSITION PAPER COMMENTS ON RAFSANJANI'S POWER MOVES

GF261508 London KEYHAN in Persian 20 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] A young ayatollah who is usually referred to as the strongman of the Islamic Republic has strengthened his position with a few new moves. Ayatollah [title as published] 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the Majlis speaker, last Sunday implicitly said that the leader of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, has effectively lost his decisive role. In a speech to a group of bazaar hezbollahis, Rafsanjani revealed that he sent the text of his speech concerning ending of free trade, to Khomeyni. This speech was part of the Friday prayer sermon during which Rafsanjani announced that the private sector will not, under any circumstances, be allowed to have a part in imports or exports. This statement effectively contradicts Khomeyni's order to the government. Khomeyni announced that the bazaaris should be able to import what they consider fit within Shari'a limitations. The Majlis speaker said in his speech: I sent my speech to the Imam so he could express his views on it. However, he did not make any comments and as a result I said my piece on Friday. Ahmad Aqa [Khomeyni's son] contacted me after the Friday prayer sermons and said that the Imam approves of my statement.

Rafsanjani said: We do not allow the leeches and parasites to come and buy dollars at 80 rials when it is worth 500 and thus make money. The time of free imports and exports has come to an end. The capitalists should die in this revolution.

He also implied that the decisions by the government to encourage the private sector have been cancelled. Following a recent speech by Khomeyni, the prime minister issued a number of circulars concerning participation by the private sector which are now presumably filed. Khomeyni himself, during an audience on 'Id al-Qadir, retracted his earlier remarks on free commerce and supported Rafsanjani's position. Rafsanjani said that he, and his advisors, were responsible for the rice distribution plan which in his opinion is the only economic success of the government. He added that he is currently working on a plan to create cooperatives in the commercial sector on the basis of which these cooperatives can play a role in foreign trade with government participation.

Rafsanjani also effectively ordered the president, who had just returned from a trip to three Arab countries, to come and give him a report. The fact that

the president was forced to go to Rafsanjani's house to give his report has strengthened the already strong position of the Majlis speaker. In his speeches, the Majlis speaker, addressing the superpowers, has informed them that he is the designer of the policies of the Islamic Government. He stressed that there will be no tilt toward either superpower, or in other words, he portrayed himself as the protector of the interests of both sides. Two weeks ago Rafsanjani ordered the removal of the photographs of Khomeyni from public buildings and to date millions of photographs of the "leader of the revolution" have been removed from office walls. Some experts are already talking about the start of an era of "Khomeyni eradication" and forecast a new arrangement in which Rafsanjani plays the pivotal role. According to experts, Rafsanjani has planned Khamene'i's removal and intends to replace the president with one of his close allies.

CSO: 4640/12



VOICE OF COMMUNIST PARTY ON NEXT IRANIAN REGIME'S FORM

TA261858 (Clandestine) Voice of the Communist Party of Iran in Persian 1730  
GMT 26 Sep 84

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Which political system should replace the Islamic Republic? The reply of the Communist Party of Iran--the party of Iran's (?aware) workers--is as follows: A revolutionary democratic republic, a republic based on the following three pillars:

1. The people's power based on council democracy. Governing power will be in the hands of People's councils, councils that set the laws and implement them.
2. The dissolution of the army and other professional armed forces divorced from the people, and their replacement with the mass arming of the people.
3. The dissolution of government bureaucracy that is above the people, and its replacement with a democratic system of running the country. All government officials--from top to bottom--will be directly chosen by the people. Any time the majority of the electorate deem fit, they may dismiss individuals chosen for these positions. Council democracy, the people's mass arming, and a democratic system for running the country's affairs are the pillars of a revolutionary democratic republic. The Communist Party of Iran is struggling for such a republic. We call on all Iran's workers, oppressed, and freedom-seeking people to unite and organize around the banner of the Communist Party of Iran in order to overthrow the Islamic Republic and establish a revolutionary democratic republic.

CSO: 4640/14

NVOI CONDEMNS SUPPRESSION OF KURDS

TA210828 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 21 Sep 84

[Unattributed commentary: "Our Peoples' Right to Self-Government Must Be Preserved"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: Undoubtedly there still are a considerable number of people in our homeland who have not forgotten the details of the inhuman and savage scorched-earth plan of the accursed Mohammad Reza. As was revealed later, the annihilated Mohammad Reza had made a commitment to his American masters to carry out a plan to turn sensitive areas of our homeland, particularly the northern border areas, into scorched earth by means of atomic and nuclear bombs, namely, the elimination and destruction of millions of Iranians and the transformation of wide areas of the country's lands into a barren land. He took this inhuman and beastly intention, however, with him to the grave.

In our homeland, we are now witnessing the implementation of this very policy by the bloody and inhuman leaders of the Islamic regime in the region of Kordestan. In order to compensate for their continuous failures to eradicate Kordestan, the Islamic regime's bloodsucking rulers are employing the inhuman and bestial scorched-earth tactic with the aim of dragging the exhilarated, courageous, and patriotic Kurdish people in blood and dust. To implement this plot, the regime has with force of arms compelled many villagers to leave their homes and havens around Sardasht, a strategic area for the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and is levelling their mud huts with mortars and shells.

In order to eliminate the Kurdish people, the Islamic regime was not content to use its own military machine, but asked for assistance from its NATO brother, Turkey, to drag the patriotic Kurdish fighters in blood and dust. Some time ago, the regime launched a large-scale offensive against the Kurdish Peshmerga and, in accordance with an agreement reached during visits by the Islamic regime's minister of foreign affairs to Turkey and by the governor-general of Turkey's Van Province to Western Azarbaijan, an army of 4,000 soldiers from Turkey's elite armed forces simultaneously launched a large-scale attack in Diyarbakir. This attack was made on the one hand to suppress the Kurdish people in Turkey, and on the other to aid the Islamic regime's rulers, and Turkish forces advanced up to 22 km into Iranian territory and 14 km into Iraqi territory.

The brutal vengeance of the bloodsucking Islamic rulers against the brave and patriotic Kurdish people is such that one can say that they are actually on a par with all anti-people regimes in suppressing the Kurdish people, and have reached an agreement with these regimes. This practical agreement has been reached with the mediation of Turkey, which entered the territories of both Iran and Iraq in pursuit of the Kurdish Peshmerga.

The Kurdish people have been fighting for many years to achieve the right to self-government. They are dying and sacrificing themselves for this objective. This just and legitimate struggle will continue until total victory is achieved. It is only the bloody, superficial, and fanatical rulers of the Islamic regime of Iran who are not able to realize this historic fact. All free Iranian people defend and support the just and patriotic struggles of the Kurdish people and their legal demand, as well as those of other peoples residing in our homeland, and condemn the policy of bloodshed and genocide of the Kurdish people by the Islamic rulers.

CSO: 4640/17

KHAMENE'I'S REMARKS ON WAR WEEK CRITICIZED

GF231340 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 22 Sep 84

[Text] Today, at the beginning of the fifth anniversary of the war between the Islamic Republic and Iraq, nothing has been gained except unaccountable wasted lives, numerous handicapped people, and enormous damage. Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, the president of Khomeyni's regime, still emphasized the war-mongering desires of the regime during a statement when he said: The officials and the commanders of the army are responsible for planning, so what we can do at an appropriate time is to start our attack. 'Ali Khamene'i repeated: The Islamic Government will not stop the war until the Iraqi Government is overthrown. Ruhollah Khomeyni has called this a war which brings nothing but misery, destruction, poverty, economic dependence, arms smuggling, and blood and tears for Iran and which has physically and mentally disabled hundreds of thousands of Iranian men, women, and children, and left thousands of families fatherless or homeless. It is the bloodiest war in the area at the present time, a cause for praying over and over again. The mullahs who fear and avoid the happy Nowruz celebrations and the Chaharshanbeh Suri celebration are now, at the time of the anniversary of this bloody war, celebrating it. This is the nature of the Islamic Republic of Ruhollah Khomeyni.

CSO: 4640/9

TEHRAN COMMENTS ON ANNIVERSARY OF WAR WITH IRAQ

GF230840 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 22 Sep 84

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Four years ago to the day, the Moslem Iranian people woke up to the roar of Iraqi planes strafing 15 towns in the north, the south, and the middle of the country. The villagers and citizens of the border towns awoke to the sounds of tanks advancing to occupy their towns and villages. In 1 hour, hundreds of kilometers of the Iraqi-Iranian border were transformed into an inferno, making the headlines in newscasts and newspapers everywhere.

At that time, [Former U.S. President] Carter was in the observation chamber of NASA watching the progress of the battles through pictures taken by satellites and sent directly to the observation chamber. As soon as the Iraqi army was in Iran and was able to record its first strikes against selected targets, the news agencies were conveying the first statement of a political source of the war. Of course, the person who made the statement was Carter, who even beat the Iraqi rulers to specifying the objective of that attack.

The plotters of the war were planning for the war to last not more than 1 or 2 weeks during which the Islamic revolution would be forced to surrender to foreign plans and would be rendered an unarmed revolution, like a bomb without a charge. All the enemies agreed on this plan. All those who were scared of the Islamic revolution, like the rulers of the region, and all those whose interests were harmed by this revolution, such as the imperialist states, and all those who were exposed by this revolution, such as the ruling regime in Baghdad, agreed to sever any vital organ from the body of the Islamic revolution in order to render it ineffective in its march.

If the Iraqi claim that Iran attacked Khanaqin on 4 September 1980 and that the Iraqi operations on 22 September 1980 were defensive is true, would it be logical to respond to such a limited attack by launching such an extensive attack in which 12 divisions and more than 2,000 tanks took part and were able, in a few moments of unawareness, to capture tens of thousands of square kilometers. If the Islamic republic had been the initiator of the war on 4 September, its troops would have been on the border on that day and the Iraqi forces would not have been able to infiltrate tens of kilometers



inside Iranian territory. This exonerates the Islamic republic from any suspicion concerning the initiation of the war. On the contrary, all the indications lead to the proof that the other side is the guilty one.

All know who is the aggressor and who has been subjected to aggression. However, to those who still do not know or who know but do not want to admit it, we say to them: Think carefully about this point in particular, discard fanaticism, and think of the objectives of the side which initiated the war and the aims for which it strove. If the aggressor is unveiled, we will know and others will know how to put a just end to this war which is entering its 5th year.

CSO: 4604/3

TEHRAN REVIEWS 'ECONOMIC WARFARE' OF NATION

GF241307 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 24 Sep 84

[Unattributed commentary: "Four Years of Sacred Warfare in the Economic Field"--  
by the research group of Central News Unit]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate.

Today has been declared a day of economic warfare in war week. Thus, let us look at the wide dimensions of this struggle and the economic levers used by world oppression against Islamic Iran and the other issues which show the greatness of the victories which the Moslem nation of Iran has achieved in the 4 years of the imposed war. Following the success of the glorious revolution of Iran and the shattering of the power equilibrium in the strategic Gulf region, world arrogance, spearheaded by the United States, based all its programs and policies on weakening, and most of all, on dragging the Islamic revolution of Iran to defeat.

Each of these programs and policies materialized in various political, military, economic, and social forms depending on conditions of time and place and had an effect, however subliminal, on the trend of the Islamic revolution. World arrogance entered the arena right in the beginning by exerting levers of economic pressure and assumed the complete and aggravated form of an imposed war by the Zionist Iraqi regime against Islamic Iran.

In any case, in light of the economic experiences which world arrogance gleaned from two global wars, and with the economic pressures earlier and on the basis of the premise that due to the war, a large part of the country's budget would be spent on war and defense expenditure, according to the colonialists, the defeat of the Islamic revolution of Iran would be imminent. But it is there that the reason for the difference between the Islamic revolution of Iran and other revolutions and the superiority of the heroic nation of Iran as contrasted with other nations of the world becomes obvious. On the whole, the two fundamental axes on which the victory of the Islamic republic of Iran is based is the presence of the people and the role of the leadership in guiding them. On the whole, the schemes of the world oppressors were not efficacious in hurling a spoke in the wheel of the revolution but each in its own way became instrumental in attaining greater victories and the dawn of hope toward final victory.

The economic embargo and the commencing of the imposed war was the reason for the presence of the Moslem nation of Iran at the war fronts and a new front in economic warfare was opened. The Moslem nation of Iran with its powerful participation in all fields of this economic struggle cooperated wholeheartedly with the government by donations for the war fronts. The growth of innovations and inventions were another victory in the economic war. Experts and dedicated Iranians were successful in providing most of the country's import needs locally by their inventions and innovations. The capping of the Nowruz oil wells by Iranian experts is one of the outstanding achievements of the growth of innovations and inventions in Islamic Iran.

Our oil exports have gone up by 20 percent since 1981. In 1983, the industrial production of the country grew by 24 percent on average. With the implementation of developmental projects and industrial projects and the successful launching of the interest-free banking scheme, the government has been able to reimburse 100 billion rials in lieu of its foreign payments without the slightest delay in the 1982-1983 period. In the same period, 55 billion rials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been received in loan claims from foreign governments and organizations. The hardworking government has been able to meet the nation's general needs and the demand for raw materials of the factories in a capable manner with the multifaceted cooperation of the people with the schemes of equitable distribution of commodities and the setting up of committees for the allocation of foreign exchange.

Hence, in comparison of the economic conditions of Iran in the beginning of the imposed war to today, it can be boldly said that we have been able to surmount all the plots of world oppression and can prepare ourselves more than ever for any other eventuality in the field of economic success.

CSO: 4640/19

COMMENTARY SAYS NEW YEAR WILL BE BETTER

GF271948 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 27 Sep 84

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] With great confidence, our Islamic nation bid farewell to a year and with stronger faith, it welcomed another year. The new year will be better than the one before.

As Iran served as the dawn of the Islamic state, there are other nations in the Islamic world which are now susceptible to a coup and can become an Islamic state. There is Iraq and Egypt, Morocco and Sudan, all of which have witnessed an upsurge against the state of ignorance and also have witnessed the beginning of an Islamic republic.

In spite of what the enemies do to try to stop this ongoing march, it is still continuing because it is not a passing phenomenon. It is an ongoing historical development.

Is there anybody who can stop the wheels of history? Today, while the Moslem nation is greeting the new Hegira year, it is in fact facing a new future in which it will find the road to the summit less difficult. There are some who paved the road for this nation. Some paved the road with their purified blood. Later they were martyred and used their martyrdom for the sake of the revolution. Others still lead the march and have the keys of victory in their hands. Others lost the chance. Let them be ready now because the time is ripe and the victory is imminent, by the will of God.

CSO: 4604/4

## EFFORTS TO PLACATE MERCHANTS, OIL-PRICE PRESSURES REPORTED

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT &amp; MEMO in English No 22, 3 Sep 84 p 9

[Text]

Iran has sought to reassure merchants that they will be allowed to continue importing goods and that their businesses will not be nationalised. The prime minister, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, last week published a directive guaranteeing their trade freedom after a meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini.

The directive aims to meet growing public and merchant dissatisfaction over the shortages of consumer goods and the threat to the position of the *bazaaris* by calls from some sections of the government for the nationalisation of foreign trade.

The prime minister's declaration, which was reported in the English-language newspaper, the *Tehran Times*, also follows a crackdown on corruption among government members, senior civil servants and the clergy, as well as criticism in the *majlis* of the government's poor handling of the economy. The first published reports under the Islamic Republic of bribery charges against public officials appeared last week.

During his meeting with the prime minister, Ayatollah Khomeini is reported to have backed the government, but also to have criticised Mr Mousavi for not doing enough for the people. He also warned against nationalisation of foreign trade. "Do not try to prevent the bazaar from carrying out its activity. This is not legitimate because people should not be denied their freedom," Iran's spiritual leader said.

Ayatollah Khomeini, for one, had not forgotten the crucial role played by the *bazaaris* in the overthrow of the shah's regime and Khomeini's coming to power.

The prime minister's directive clearly sought to bolster the business sector's confidence in the government by also encouraging private investment, warning against short-term and arbitrary changes in trading regulations and calling for special attention to be paid to importers.



The industrial sector will also receive special attention. Iran will invest \$2.75bn in the industrial sector during the current financial year to raise production, the industry minister, Gholamreza Shafei, said last week. Particular attention would be given to government-owned and -subsidised factories, he said. He also said that a share of oil revenues would be invested in strategic industries to guarantee foreign exchange.

However, Iran is still facing strong pressure to discount its oil prices and reports last week said that production had been cut back by 50 per cent of its 2.4mn b/d Opec quota. The petroleum minister, Mohammed Gharazi, said the cut had been made to protect Opec unity. He said the organisation was being subjected to pressures from "international companies and imperialist powers in a bid to weaken it."

Gulf oil traders said last week that Iran risked losing some customers permanently unless discounts offered were sufficiently attractive to tempt tanker-owners to run the risk of Iraqi air attacks plying to Kharg Island. Japanese information released last week showed a sharp rise in the volume of oil purchases from Saudi Arabia at the expense of Iran, despite the lull in the "tanker war". Since then, Iran has hardened its oil prices, offering discounts only up to one dollar to compensate for high insurance rates. Oil traders were speculating last week that Iran would have to offer lower prices if its war effort against Iraq is not to be jeopardised.

CSO: 4600/10

## IRAN

### MONTAZERI: SELF-SUFFICIENCY TO BE ACHIEVED THROUGH MASS EDUCATION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 9 Sep 84 pp 22-23

[Text] Qom--Members of the Islamic Society of Teachers and the National Union of Islamic Teachers' Societies, along with a number of members of the mobilization and workers from some of the country's factories met with Ayatollah al-Ozma Montazeri.

During the meeting, Hojjat ol-Eslam Hadi Khamene'i, His Holiness Ayatollah al-Ozma Montazeri's representative in the Union of Islamic Teachers' Societies, began by saluting Teaching and Training Week. He referred to the role of the Islamic Teachers' and Students' Societies, and he called upon officials to pay greater attention to this revolutionary body, which has arisen from the loins of the revolution within the schools.

Ayatollah al-Ozma Montazeri then gave a talk in which he referred to the anniversary of the martyrdom of two great teachers, martyrs Bahonar and Raja'i, and their laudable role in the Islamic revolution. He said: In Islam, exceptional importance is attached to the matters of teaching, training, and knowledge. In that age of savagery and ignorance in the Arabian peninsula, when no one placed any value on knowledge and reading and writing, the first surah of the Koran to be revealed to the noble Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) begins with the matter of reading, writing, studying, and teaching; this says something about Islam's careful attention to learning and culture.

He added: At that same time, when Iran was considered a civilized and advanced country, study and knowledge were a monopoly of the nobility and the court. Ayatollah Montazeri told the story of the cobbler who went to the Iranian shah Anushirvan, mistakenly known as "The Just," who wished to borrow money for war. The cobbler told him: I will pay for the war provided you allow my son to study and become literate. Anushirvan angrily rejected this proposal, and said: How can I allow the son of a cobbler to become literate and join the ranks of princes, and sons of nobility? Ayatollah Montazeri added: It was in this time that Islam deemed it necessary for every person at every age, in all places, even as remote as China, to study and attain knowledge, and provided for great rewards in the hereafter to students and scholars.

He noted: The main mystery of the immediate acceptance of the sacred religion of Islam by Iranians, who were famous for their talent and intelligence, was in the fact that they found their very lost selves in Islam. Otherwise, a nation could not be converted to a religion by force of the sword.

Ayatollah al-Ozma Montazeri, stressing the necessity of creating national self-sufficiency in the areas of knowledge and industry, added: As long as our nation is dependent on the East or the West from the standpoints of industry or knowledge, neither the rallying cries of "Death to America" and "Death to the Soviet Union" nor the calls for self-sufficiency and independence, which are among the great goals of the revolution, will have meaning for us. Therefore, we must do everything in our power to raise the country's level of knowledge and culture and mobilize ourselves to cut industrial dependence and dependence on foreigners, no matter how gradually. The first step that must be taken is to have teachers and educational officials impart character to our young people. For several centuries imperialism was able to take our character away from us so that we were unable to perceive ourselves and the talents and abilities hidden in our young people, and to sense our character. He added: The second step is for the country's respected educational officials to pay attention to the importance of this matter and make the necessary resources available for those who have talent and are capable of innovating in various fields. The secret of the advancement of Europe, America, and other places in industry and science is not in the exceptional talent of their nations. Due to the temperate climate we live in, the people of our nation have more powerful talents and mental capacities than do those living near the pole. What has taken them to advancement is the attention they have given to providing many resources to their innovators, eliminating the obstructionism and limitations that hampered their work, and preparing the entire field of activity for them. With the problems we have now, we have created new ministries since the revolution, and I don't know if this was necessary or not, but we have a ministry or at least a powerful and equipped organization to deal with the matter of innovation, recruit innovators and inventors, study each of their work, fields, and needs, and provide them with appropriate resources, and, far removed from paper-shuffling and cold encounters, we have attracted many people and minds with talent and creativity in various fields.

He stressed: There is no other way than this to achieve industrial and scientific self-sufficiency and cut dependence on foreigners. Concerning the responsibilities of the Islamic societies and their role in the schools and universities, he stressed: The work of the Islamic societies is very delicate and sensitive. The brothers and sisters must make every effort to attract those who view Islam and the revolution with indifference and pessimism and make them hopeful and optimistic by giving them Islamic ethical education and educational and study resources on the truths of Islam. If they know, for example, of a person's intellectual or moral deficiencies in the past, they must not expose and disgrace a Muslim; just as the Imam said, let them be evaluated as they are today. The Islamic societies must operate in such a way that scientific and specialist minds can raise the academic level of our schools and colleges. They must realize that such professors as these who are willing to teach in their country without plotting against it are far better

than those professors in Europe and America who force our young people to study with them. At least these people are a part of our own nation and country. In conclusion, he stressed the matter of greater attention on the part of educational centers to Islamic and ethical affairs, relations between students and seminaries, and making greater use of committed clergymen and religious scholars.

During the last few days, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Abu al-Fazl Musavi Tabrizi and Feda'i, Majlis representatives of the people of Tabriz and Sar Bandar-e Arak, met with His Holiness Ayatollah al-Ozma Montazeri and spoke concerning the problems in their area. According to the same report, in a visit with members of the Islamic Society of the Marvdasht Experimental Industrial Factory of Shiraz, His Holiness Ayatollah al-Ozma Montazeri was presented with 5.5 million rials from the workers of this factory for the purpose of strengthening the war fronts.

9310

CSO: 4640/406

## IRAN CLANDESTINE REPORTS RIFTS WITHIN CLERICS

CF190908 (Clandestine) Radio Nejat-e Iran in Persian 1630 GMT 18 Sep 84

[Text] The signs of differences between the clergymen of Iran are becoming more apparent every day. The Radio Nejat-e Iran correspondent in Qom has reported that the clergymen--who in the past had been supporting the so-called Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeyni--have been gradually withdrawn from the bastion in Qom, in increasing numbers every day. The (?teachers at Sahebnam) school seldom attend their class now. They either sit home or attend meetings in their homes at which they criticize the regime for its anti-Shari'a activities, and they warn of the possible consequences of this unruly behavior.

According to our correspondent, visits by Montazeri and certain other clergymen close to the regime, to the ailing Golpayegani, who is among the leading people in the country, are being used as an occasion for a kind of pampering and paying of attention to his demands.

Ruhollah Khomeyni, who has imposed pressures and constriction even on officials in the seats of learning and on the religious centers of the country, remains totally oblivious to criticism against the illogical actions of his regime leaders levelled by prominent clergymen at leading centers of religion. In fact, Khomeyni in his recent bitter attacks on such clergymen has gone so far as to call them selfish counterrevolutionaries and even royalists. However, as you are aware, the ruler at Jamaran has recently removed several such clergymen from their sensitive posts, including Mahdavi Kani, and have demoted them to second class jobs.

CSO: 4640/16



NVOI ACCUSES REGIME OF MISUSING RELIGION

GF261733 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 25 Sep 84

[Commentary: "Misuse of the Name of Islam, Koran, and [words indistinct]]"

[Text] Dear compatriots, Mr Mas'ud Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran organization, in a recent interview with the AL-HAWADITH magazine, in answer to a question about whether the dislike for the present regime has reached the level of the shah and his family, said: Those who rose to struggle against the shah's regime, rose to fight his 36 years of dictatorial monarchy. Now we are fighting an oppression which has armed itself with something called Islam and with [word indistinct] has used a religious crusade to serve as the means to continue a war which is only serving the propagation of the regime. This is a fact that the struggling people of Iran, united, rose to struggle against the blood-sucking 36-year dictatorship of the cursed Mohammad Reza and gave thousands of sacrifices in this holy struggle. The main objectives of the struggling people of Iran in this revolution consisted of the overthrow of the self-styled dictatorship of the Pahlavi regime; the uprooting of the plundering control of imperialism and especially U.S. imperialism; to obtain democratic rights for all the people; to ensure social justice for the benefit of the socially deprived; an end to the plunder of the national wealth; and to ensure the right to one's destiny for all the various nations in Iran.

The leaders of the Islamic regime, early after the victory of the revolution, being in vital need of popular support and the support of the truly popular parties and organizations of the masses, officially undertook to achieve these goals of the revolution. In those days, Ayatollah Khomeyni talked about the important role of the people and the oppressed in the revolution. He called them "foundations of the revolution" and gave them as many golden promises as he could. Was it not Ayatollah Khomeyni who called this same Mojahedin-e Khalq his own children and talked about their role and the role of other revolutionary organizations and parties in the victory of the revolution? However, the life of such pretenses was very short. The leaders of the dictatorial regime at first made Mojahedin-e Khalq the target of their barbaric and cruel attacks.

Mr Mas'ud Rajavi noted in the same interview that the regime has taken 40 thousand martyrs from this organization to date, while tens of thousands of the revolutionary children of the nation have been put in chains in the regime's medieval prisons. The blood-sucking executioners of the regime even take infant children of martyred mothers to prisons. They have and continue to commit all these crimes in the name of Islam.

After Mojahedin came the turn of the Tudeh's--these strugglers for freedom and social justice--and Fada'iyane Khalq--these true and struggling children of our homeland--to become the target of the cruel and animalistic attacks of the executioners of the Islamic regime.

The crimes that the blood-sucking executioners of the Islamic regime have committed against Mojahedin, Tudeh's, Fada'iyane, and other true revolutionary strugglers on the basis of the declarations of the highest official of the Islamic Republic have no parallel even in the history of the most barbaric tribes. As you know all these crimes have been committed in the name of Islam, government of Allah and Koran.

Yes, it is true that we are now facing an oppression which has armed itself with something called Islam and has accepted the services of a religious crusade. However, the aware and struggling people of our homeland are gradually coming to realize the meaning of this crusade and the weapon of Islam, that the dastardly and crafty rulers of the Islamic regime have made the instrument of their crimes and craftiness very well and know that religion, Koran, and Islam are only weapons for these gentlemen to strengthen their blood-sucking medieval government. Under such circumstances, struggle against such rulers and the revelation of their true nature is the duty of any Iranian patriot. The ugly and publicly deceitful face of these crafty rulers who are traitors to the revolution should especially be shown to those who are still trapped by these crafty reactionary leaders.

CSO: 4640/10

## BRIEFS

IRAN CLANDESTINE ON GUARDS' SUBVERSION PLANS--In a communique issued by the central headquarters in Tehran to all its units in the country, the Guards' Corps stated that in the near future, a series of subversive acts, bombings and conflagrations will take place. A plan has been discovered to bomb the country's railroad routes, the communique said. The Guards Corps has not, however, revealed the details of this plan in their classified communique and has not mentioned the agents who will implement it. It is hoped that this report by the Clandestine Free Voice of Iran today will make the hireling Guards' Corps members refrain from fresh acts of arson. In the past the Khomeyni regime's Guards have accused opponents of the regime of their own acts of subversion. The last bombing by the Guards was at the Tehran railroad station which killed 18 and injured 300. [Text] [GF181646 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 18 Sep 84]

ISRAEL'S EXPULSION FROM UN--Both Rabbi (Arqil Davudi), a religious leader of the Jewish community in Iran, and Dr Manuchehr Nikruz, representative of the Jewish community in the Majlis, today issued a statement in which they expressed their support for the just stand of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning its draft resolution on having the Zionist entity expelled from the United Nations. The statement stressed that Iranian Jews, like all other Iranian groups, support the efforts aimed at removing the effects of oppression and aggression and at regaining the rights usurped from the oppressed and persecuted people of the world. [Text] [GF251757 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1430 GMT 25 Sep 84]

CSO: 4604/2

COMMENTARY ON GENEVA TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN

GF281120 Rawalpindi HAIDAR in Urdu 13 Sep 84 p 3

[Editorial: "Geneva Talks and Their Future"]

[Excerpts] No hopeful progress was made in the last round of Geneva talks [on Afghanistan]. According to the UN secretary general's emissary, Mr Cordovez, whose opinion should be considered the most knowledgeable regarding the thinking of the parties involved, conveys the impression that any optimism pinned on the next round of talks in the coming year would be unrealistic.

As far as the Afghan refugees are concerned, Afghanistan has left its doors open for their return. However, it seems that the Pakistani Government's arrangement to house them in camps and to support them has made them so complacent that they do not wish to return to their homeland. Even if a concerted solution is found to return them to their homeland with the assistance of their representatives, it is possible that they may refuse to do so and choose not to earn a livelihood through hard work and toil, but prefer to remain in the refugee camps and partake of the joint hospitality of the United Nations, some Western and Arab nations, as well as the Government of Pakistan. The latter has already spent millions of rupees supporting them and this financial burden will increase in the future. Under the UN regulations for refugees, a group of refugees can only be given financial aid for 5 years on humanitarian ground, after which those who have left their countries and emigrated to other countries cannot be placed in the category of "refugees" nor can they receive any assistance from the United Nations. The five-year period since the Afghan refugees began to enter Pakistan will elapse by the end of this year, after which it is expected that the United Nations will halt or reduce to a minimum its financial aid to the refugees, and then Pakistan will have to bear the brunt of this expenditure. As a result of the prolonged war in Afghanistan, the interest of the Western and Arab countries will begin to wane and the burden of the support of 3 million Afghan refugees will have to be borne by the Pakistani Government alone. This will be very difficult for the Pakistani people and the government to bear. Hence, it would be expedient if our foreign minister concentrated his attention on arranging for the return of the Afghan refugees to their homes in the next round of talks in Geneva. This would be fruitful to both sides. The needless insistence that a representative of the Afghan refugees must participate should be dispensed with.

Meanwhile, it would also be appropriate for the Pakistani Government to revise its policy of hospitality toward the Afghan refugees so that they should be forced to understand that it is time for them to think in terms of returning home to work and toil. We hope that the various leaders of the Afghan refugee organizations will return to their country instead of trying to change the course of events in Afghanistan ensconced in false hopes while sitting in Pakistan and carrying on mere propaganda. They should join the rest of the 1 crore Afghans at home in changing the future destiny of Afghanistan. If they do not wish to tolerate the presence of foreign forces on their soil, the desired course would be for them to return to Afghanistan so that the pressure on the Soviet forces may increase to the extent that the latter may be forced to consider a compromise which would be acceptable to Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

We feel that if all the parties concerned agree that Afghanistan's geographical situation demands that it should remain an ally of the Soviet Union then, following such an acceptance, the Soviet Union should have no excuse for delaying the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan can express its sympathy in a positive way by persuading those elements which are opposed to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan to effect a rapprochement with Moscow. The past 5 years have shown that no solution to the Afghan issue can be imposed which is not acceptable to the Soviets. This is a home truth which the ICP member nations should at least acknowledge and should review the organization's resolutions in this light, as they thus far have not helped much in the political solution of the Afghan issue.

We also would like to inform our American friends to stop taking such an interest in the affairs of Afghanistan so that any misconception that the Soviet Union might have about their aspirations could be eliminated. In our opinion, if the Kremlin echelons continue to feel that the United States will continue its activities to threaten the safety of its southern frontiers, then it will not be surprising if it tightens up on its own security measures in the region. In order to make the Soviet Union feel that its safety is not threatened, the United States will not only have to stop expecting changes in Afghanistan, it will also have to forget its plans to enter Iran through the backdoor. In this connection we would also like to advise the Iranian leadership, with due respect, that despite its ideological differences it should consider keeping its relations with the Soviet Union free from any tension in its own interest and for the sake of peaceful coexistence in an objective manner and thus make a positive contribution toward drawing nearer a peaceful solution to the Afghan issue.

CSO: 4656/1



FORMER AIR CHIEF REVIEWS COUNTRY'S GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1, 3, 4, 5 Sep 84

[Article by Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Zulfiqar Khan]

[1 Sep 84 p 4]

[Text] To say that history is dynamic may sound like an understatement when one considers the changes that have taken place in this brief period in Pakistan and the area around it. These events have left a lasting imprint on the history of the region. Their political, economic, strategic and military effects will be felt for a long time and may bring about changes of great significance in the area.

The region is a particularly apt place for study because it is the scene of some of the important social upheavals of the period--in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan was the victim of a large scale and successful military intervention by India, in support of the secessionist movement in East Pakistan. Iran was where the U.S. went through a great humiliation over the hostage affair. In Afghanistan there was a large scale Soviet military intervention. There is, therefore, enough cause for this area to be considered particularly sensitive, especially when one takes into account the ongoing Iran-Iraq war and its effects on the Gulf region.

Pakistan has three of the largest countries as its neighbours, China with a population of over one billion or a quarter of the entire world's population, India with 730 million people and the Soviet Union (a recently acquired neighbour with its annexation of Wakhan created by the British to provide physical separation between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire) with a population of 267 million. Add this to the population of Iran (40 million), Afghanistan (19 million) and Pakistan (90 million) and we have half the world's people living in this region.

Military Powers

Three of the world's four largest armed forces belong to Pakistan's neighbours: Russia (3,638,000), China (4,325,000) and India (1,120,000). The other great military power is the United States (2,068,000), which though geographically far, has great interest in the area because of

Pakistan's proximity to the Gulf, Russian military intervention in Afghanistan and the situation created by the Iran-Iraq war. Thus, all the four great military powers of the world are involved in the region.

Although both the Soviet Union and China are communist, there are sharp differences between them. Both are contenders for the communist papacy and accuse each other of being hegemonic and traitors to the cause of communism. The two have despised each other since their split in 1959. India has the proud claim to be the world's largest democracy. It is predominantly a Hindu country, where due to augmentation of Hindu militancy secularism is under stress, as is evident from the Muslim killings, frequency of (communal riots) of Pakistan's two Muslim neighbours. Afghanistan, which until 1973 was ruled by a feudal monarch now has a Soviet backed, socialist government and Iran is an Islamic Republic after the overthrow of the dictatorial monarchy of the late Shah. Political differences notwithstanding, Pakistan has very close religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural links with her Muslim neighbours. In fact the same tribes straddle the borders between the three countries. The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan are Pathans, who constitute 40% of the Afghan population are akin to some 8 million pathans living in Pakistan. Similarly, the Baluch live in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

#### Powder Keg

The countries of the region have had their share of conflict and strife. Pakistan and India have fought three wars since they attained independence in 1947. The law war was fought in 1971 in which Pakistan was in Indian estimation, cut down to size. Similarly, India suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of China in 1962. Sino-Soviet bitterness reupted in border fighting along the Ussuri River in 1969. The Revolution in Afghanistan (1978) and Iran (1979), Russian military intervention in Afghanistan (1979) and the ongoing Iran-Iraq war may be, are isolated events but the combination of these upheavals has produced a veritable powder keg.

While all these happenings may have separate causes, they nevertheless overlap. They have an area common to each. But they also have separate areas as is the case with Pakistan which is confronted with some very serious problems, some of which exist because of what is happening in its neighbourhood. It is, therefore, imperative to understand the strength, weaknesses, ambitions and compulsions of our neighbours (and the super powers) because all these factors affect the security of Pakistan one way or another.

Some very responsible and serious thinking Indians see an inevitability of India's future as a regionally dominant power. This vision becomes understandable when considered from the Indian viewpoint and examined against the powerful arguments on which it is based.

The foremost argument is India's sheer geographical size and strategically unique location. It is illuminating that a lot of Indians, when they speak of the Indian land mass, cannot repress themselves even at the present time from making it clear that what they are really talking about is the entire sub-continent of South Asia.

In the historical context, Indians seem to be driven by an urge to eradicate the injustices done to the inhabitants of their land mass over the centuries; the last being the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.

India's population presently stands at 730 million. The fact that the majority of this population is existing at below subsistence level, that none of the country's 5 year plans except the first met all its targets and that the annual economic growth is only a little ahead of the population rise, is itself the third most powerful compulsion for India to seek a variety of options, including the use of force to improve her economic outlook in the coming years.

But while long-term Indian thinking goes along the foregoing lines, its leaders have their feet firmly on the ground. None of the compulsions drive the Indians towards achieving the national goals overnight or by some single act of advancement. The country's development plans and its constantly adjusting political relationship with the super powers and other countries is carefully chalked out and frequently reviewed at high national levels. There is no wavering from the perception that India's destiny lies in achieving a world status commensurate with its size and the Ashokan heritage.

That India's eyes are set on a grand and powerful image of itself is also borne out by its sharply rising defence budgets since the 1971 war (Rs 1500 crore in 72-73 to more than Rs 8000 crores in 84-85). Given the serious economic crises that the country continually faces and the total elimination of "threat" from East Pakistan, it would have been more natural for India to content itself with increasing the defence budget at the same level as the previous years. On the contrary, the largest escalation in her defence spending has occurred over the last decade. This rate of growth of the defence budget is a pointer to India's heightened military ambitions in South Asia in the coming years.

#### Regional Power

India's existing capabilities and resources in most fields indicate that it certainly has the potential to match the will of its leaders. The country has demonstrated a most remarkable capacity for absorbing internal strife and a host of problems arising from a mixture of a vastly dissimilar people which inhabit its states. The confidence that the experience of unifying such a large population inspires must also be seen as a source of national power.

The successful invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 is an unforgettable experience for the Indian armed forces. Outright military victories of this kind are rare in recent history. The two most important implications of this highly successful campaign were: firstly, that it liberated the Indian Armed Forces from their feelings of inferiority arising from the 1962 and 1965 conflicts and secondly, it has served to remove any reservations from Indian minds about the moral aspects of such actions, thus opening up future possibilities of more liberation wars on the same pattern.

The significance of India's nuclear test (1974), the launching of its indigenously produced satellite (1975), and man in the space (1984) is (sometimes perhaps deliberately) underplayed by some international observers. In fact, all these achievements are indicative of the tremendous technological capabilities that India has acquired over the past decade. Besides being prestigious achievements, both space and nuclear research lead to the simultaneous spin-off development of many other technologies which greatly enhance the economic and military power of a nation.

#### National Power

There are two other ways in which India has since 1971 increased her potential as a regional power. The Indo-Soviet treaty has far reaching military implications and whenever necessary, both India and the Soviet Union do not hesitate to underline this fact. Secondly, the creation of Bangladesh has greatly improved the military balance in India's favour.

It is possible that the foregoing gains made by India, both in stature and actual power, may be offset to a degree if its present and future governments fail to cope with the chronic economic stagnation and population problems. Decisions taken to maintain inter-state uniformity of supplies and development in conditions of severe shortage and inflation are not popular and could lead to fissiparous tendencies. Language issues have more than once created serious hinderances in the unification efforts. Even strong and respected leadership such as that provided by Nehru and Indira Gandhi may not be successful in reversing the increasingly dismal economic trends. This could give rise to and rapidly bring to surface, militant tendencies in the country's political leadership.

Another detracting factor may prove to be the gradually diminishing international image of India as a secular, peace loving, non-aligned bulwark of democracy. Its professions of non-alignment are, in many countries, looked upon with mistrust and cynicism. Despite these setbacks Indian leadership still cherishes the old Nehru-inspired secular and moralistic image, even if this guise is preserved to conceal the increasing Hindu militancy.

[3 Sep 84 p 4]

[Text] What could seriously upset the scheme of things from the Indian view point would be substantial scientific advancement in Pakistan ( a neighbour now 'cut down to size'), thus causing acute political embarrassment to India's image abroad and at home. Any extraordinary scientific development in Pakistan (such as breakthrough in nuclear technology) would be seen in India as a challenge to her stature as the only power of consequence in the region.

The furtherance and preservation of India's recently acquired superior military position has already become such a precious policy cornerstone that even Pakistan's attempt to bring about a modest modernisation of its numerically inferior armed forces is seen as a threat to India's position.

## Irritants

Another irritant could come from the internal security situation in some of the states like Indian Punjab, Kashmir and Assam. Changes in the region could bring about renewed and greatly reactivated secessionist movements which India has failed to crush fully, and this could cause serious distractions for New Delhi.

Meanwhile, the propaganda against Pakistan continues unabated. The Indian President, Prime Minister and several ministers have continued making allegations about Pakistan's alleged military deployment against India, acquisition of U.S. arms, stockpiling of nuclear material, interference in the internal affairs of India, and help and encouragement to Sikh extremists in the East Punjab. In fact, nothing adverse seems to be happening in India today without the hidden hand of Pakistan being allegedly behind it.

While using the bogey of a twin threat from China and Pakistan, an unusually fast pace of work has gone on opposite Pakistan's borders to build up an elaborate infrastructure for launching and supporting offensive operations against Pakistan. Indians, apart from utilizing massive Soviet assistance, have continued to spend large resources on enhancing the mobility, fire power and sophistication of their war machine to build up an effective military superiority for achieving their ultimate goal of dominating Pakistan.

Indian Armed Forces are the world's fourth largest, behind Russia, China and the United States. The Indian Army of one million is more than twice the size of Pakistan's. Its Air Force has nearly 800 combat aircraft compared with Pakistan's 250. The Indian Defence Minister disclosed that Moscow's military Package will include a new fighter plane that is claimed to be superior to the F-16. Other reports indicate that it might be MIG-29 or MIG-31, both new designs that soon will go into production in the Soviet Union. Other items in the military pipeline are armoured troop carriers, a quick reaction surface to air missile system and Indian production of Soviet T.72 tanks. India also wants to upgrade its navy with Kashin-class destroyers and more Soviet diesel powered submarines to join the eight it already has. In addition, India is reported to be negotiating with Moscow to buy two 7,700 Ton Kresta II Class cruisers with a steaming range of 10,000 miles. India obviously wants to have a blue water Navy and be a real Indian Ocean power. India is also spending 1.3 billion dollars in precious foreign exchange on Mirage 2000 Jet Fighters from France and has bought British Jaguar strike aircraft and Sea Harrier V.T.O.L. Jets for its one aircraft carrier Vikrant. India also wants to buy C-130 transport planes, TOW Anti-Tank missiles and self propelled 155mm Howitzers from the United States.

On the whole, it appears certain that while the future potential of India to undertake military action is enormous, the country even now possesses adequate resources to aggress against Pakistan, if it chooses to do so.



## Treaty

India has not relaxed insistence on Pakistan agreeing to their proposed treaty of friendship and cooperation. It apparently desires to build up the treaty into a strong bilateral mechanism. The treaty could then be used to confine all Indo-Pakistan matters within the parameters of bilateral relations as well as contain Pakistan's identity within sub-continental limits.

There are strong compulsions which are driving Indian leadership towards transforming India into a strong and economically independent regional power surrounded by a ring of dependent states, of which one is to be Pakistan. There was hardly any reckless element in India's decision to invade East Pakistan. Despite China and the U.S. openly denouncing India's position, a few highly perceptive leaders of that country refused to be unnerved and correctly determined that all things considered, an opportunity of a very rare kind had presented itself. Therefore, in the middle and later months of 1971, India carried out a highly skillful international opinion building campaign and masterfully exploited every Pakistani error, until she successfully transformed the character of the then imminent invasion into a liberation war.

Subsequent introspection seems to have committed India even further to this political process and it seems unlikely that she would precipitate any future military action without prior diplomatic action to project a "cause" and even if it did not exist, without making a serious effort at convincing at least some nations that it did.

There may be an expectation of some political warning although it would be highly imprudent for Pakistan not to remain fully alert for other signs of a nasty surprise which would not be difficult to find in the tension-laden atmosphere of political and economic crisis that prevails in the developing countries today. It may consist of both expected (Kashmir dispute) and unexpected (the recent Indian attempt to implicate Pakistan in the ongoing Sikh agitation in Punjab) and adequate caution is therefore necessary to avoid any traps.

It was perhaps with this perception of threat that Pakistan offered 'No War Pact' to India which was not accepted for the reasons that such an eventuality has already been covered by the Simla Agreement. India instead came out with a proposal for a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This agreement was unacceptable to Pakistan because it contained certain clauses which impinged on its sovereignty. Since then, there have been a number of meetings at various levels but not much progress has been made. Such agreements are useful to the extent that they help to lessen the tensions but they may not prove strong enough to dissuade a country to resist the temptation when compulsions and capabilities exist.

We should be quite clear that if ever we give an opportunity to India the like of which we did in 1971 when the total lack of prudence and recklessness had become the hallmark of our policies, India would take advantage regardless of whether or not we have the 'No War Pact.'

### Angry Sikhs

The Indian Army action in the Golden Temple in Amritsar has understandably angered Sikhs, not only in India, but all over the world. Some of them have even vowed to wreak vengeance on the perpetrators of this unforgivable and unforgettable drama. Even moderates amongst the community have shown deep resentment. With some justification, they feel that the situation could have been handled in a less bloody and messy manner. They also feel that the excessive show of force was more for political reasons than to control the situation; the aim being to convince the Hindu population of Punjab and Haryana, who had been terrorised by the Sikh extremists for the past two years that New Delhi could best protect their interests.

The Sikh agitation is still going on and the extremist element is also active. Cases of sabotage have been reported from various parts of Indian Punjab. Hate and suspicion still divides Sikhs and Hindus. There is even a demand for a separate Sikh state. Highly emotive language is being used by the Sikhs because the wounds are still fresh from the carnage in the Golden Temple and desecration of one of their holiest shrines, the Akal Takht. In such an atmosphere facts tend to get obscured and the real situation becomes difficult to discern.

### Careful Handling

A lot will depend on how the situation is handled at the political level. However, looking at the events as they have unfolded, the situation may not quieten down in the near future and may continue to simmer for a long time with occasional outbursts. But the fact is that the Sikh community as a whole have done rather well for themselves in comparison to their size with other communities in India. There are 3.2 million Sikhs living outside Punjab in various parts of India where they have done extremely well for themselves in business, industry and agriculture. The Sikhs are also well represented in the services, particularly, the Indian Army. They are not exactly a deprived or persecuted minority of India, and more importantly, they understand it. So, a great majority of Sikhs have no cause for separatism or prolonged agitation. The last and perhaps the most important factor is that the Sikhs in India, in common with their compatriots, have a system available to them in their country which permits them to take out their anger and frustration; and that is the ballot box. Howsoever imperfect the system of democracy might be, it still remains a wonderful means of absorbing the crisis, such as being witnessed in the Indian Punjab today.

However, it should not be forgotten that India with its many languages, its many ethnic groups and its great size is a fairly unstable country. The country has been kept together because of the strong democratic institutions and a statesman with a great mind like Nehru who was at the helm of affairs

for 17 uninterrupted years. However, if the desire to dominate the region requires a large military establishment and appropriation regardless of the socio-economic conditions, democracy may succumb to strife. If communal, ethnic and linguistic differences divide the country in hostile groups, changing political argument into blind hate, the road to dictatorship will be open.

[4 Sep 84 p 4]

[Text] It was the Russian military intervention in Dec 1979 which brought Afghanistan out of its relative obscurity as a poor, landlocked country which until the departure of the British from India in 1947, had acted as a buffer state between the British Empire and the Soviet Union. After the departure of the British from India in 1947 it came under the strategic dominance of the Soviet Union. This concept was not contested by the United States because it had no real interest in that country; the American focus of interest being in the Gulf Region.

#### Feudal Monarchy

Until 1973, Afghanistan was ruled by an autocratic feudal monarchy and power was concentrated in the hands of an elitist class. Patronage and family influence counted far more than merit. Government functionaries were treated as a privileged group. All this increased corruption and personal fortunes were made by those in power. The incompetent bureaucracy grew until size alone would have made it inefficient. The economic situation was made worse by a severe drought in 1971 which led to a famine. The situation provided an opportunity to Daud who overthrew the King and proclaimed Afghanistan a Republic.

Daud had come into power with the help of Parcham faction of the PDPA. He promised reforms but after 1974, increasingly under pressure from the Shah of Iran, Daud went back on his earlier promises and purged the leftists from his government. Although substantial economic assistance was now available from Iran and Saudi Arabia, the economic reforms were blocked by mismanagement and an inefficient bureaucracy. Politics remained stifled and corruption flourished. This gave rise to discontent in the middle classes, the civil and the Army, and an opportunity to PDPA to penetrate the Army and build up certain support for itself.

What triggered the coup was that following the assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber, the editor of Parcham Newspaper, several PDPA leaders were arrested. The Party struck back with the help of the Army and seized power on 27th April, 1978. Daud and his family were killed. The causes of the coup which brought a leftist government to power were internal. It was Daud who had provoked a leftist reaction against PDPA which brought about his fall.

A new government was formed with Nur Mohammad Taraki as President and Babrak Karmal as Vice-President, but the Khalq faction of PDPA of which Amin was the leader controlled the coalition. The government promised economic and social reforms which included recognition of the cultural rights

of all ethnic and national minorities, abolished peasants debts and usury, so common in Afghanistan. These reforms were generally popular but it was the agrarian and educational reforms and the manner in which they were implemented that proved to be the undoing of the regime. Hafizullah Amin seized power and ousted members of the rival Parcham faction from key posts. The reforms launched by Hafizullah Amin proved to be disastrous. He tried to replace the tribal structure with a communist administrative network, arousing armed resistance. The opposition to the regime mounted which in turn led to more repression by Amin. The insurrection spread and the regime became more isolated as the anti-government feelings increased in the countryside. There were large scale desertions in the Army and by the middle of 1979 the Afghan Army had been reduced to half its original size of 85,000. In September, Taraki was arrested and later executed. Amin by now had so weakened the structure of the state and inflamed tribal rebellion by repression that he could not have held on to power much longer.

#### Protecting its own

Russia decided to save the pro-Soviet regime and restabilize the situation by sending in its troops. On 27th December 1979, Soviet troops intervened. Amin was overthrown and executed and Babrak Karmal was installed as President. He declared an unconditional amnesty and released political prisoners.

The resistance which, until the Russian intervention had been receiving limited military and financial assistance from outside, now began to receive support on a much larger scale. From its start in 1978, the resistance grew in a fragmented and uncoordinated manner. Its motives varied widely and the movement lacked a clear common goal; they were only united in their rejection of the regime, opposition to agrarian and educational reforms, dislike of centralisation and government interference in local affairs.

Protracted warfare of this kind demands a complicated organisation at both political and military levels. This is lacking among the resistance groups who continue to fight without any coordination and the efforts to bring them together have failed up to date. Poor organisation and lack of cohesion are some of the main drawbacks of the resistance movement.

Because of lack of organisation there is no single strategy. For successful resistance it is imperative that the strategy should encompass political, social, economic and psychological factors to which the military movement should be subordinated. In the case of Afghan resistance it is the commander of the group doing the actual fighting who regards himself as the final authority to decide all matters and does not accept any political direction. The only strategy he knows is hit and run tactics.

#### Right Leadership

The vicissitudes of such prolonged struggles also demand a leader not only endowed with extraordinary intelligence and courage but also buttressed by an almost fanatic belief in himself and the cause. Lenin, Mao, Tito, Giap, Ho Chi Minh, Ben Bella, Castro, Che Guevara and Ayatollah Khomeini who led



successful resistance movements were all unusual personalities with civilian background. But all were able to attract followers, to organise them and instill discipline unmatched even by the most professional armies.

In addition to a single centralised leadership which directs all facets of resistance including political, economic and military, the movement must have outstanding leadership at all levels if the struggle is to succeed against heavy odds, as is the case in Afghanistan.

Lack of proper weapons is yet another drawback of the Afghan resistance. They have very few anti tank and anti aircraft weapons. Their courage and determination cannot make up for their debilitating lack of arms.

So far Afghan resistance has been sustained largely by its own aggressive determination in keeping with tribal culture and their warrior traditions. Afghan resistance continues to fight in the face of odds inspired by their independent traditions and perhaps they will continue to do so for a long time as they do not submit to foreign intervention easily. Sadly, however, their methods do not conform to the dictates of a successful resistance. The present regime in Afghanistan has adopted a number of means to isolate the resistance from the people. They give money to the local tribal chiefs for development and let them spend it in whatever way they see fit.

There is no interference in the tribal affairs. Stipends are paid to all religious figures including the imams, and the mosques are being maintained at Government expense. Auqaf lands are exempt from land reforms. These and other similar measures have a strong appeal for religious susceptibilities and tribal self-interest because it has brought economic and political rewards for them. Tribal allegiances are traditionally fragile and changeable, determined by the shifting interests of the group. Thus powerful incentives are being provided for the local tribes to stay out of fighting. They have been given defacto autonomy. They may not like the regime in Kabul but they cooperate as they have done with many regimes in the past. Although there is some breakdown of administration in the provinces, there is also evidence that in some areas government efforts to regain control are beginning to pay.

In the cities, efforts are being made to create new jobs for the young unemployed. National resources are being exploited to boost economy. However, for quite some time to come the Afghan government would remain economically and militarily dependent on the Soviet Union.

#### Loyalties

Desertions are dropping and the Army is being strengthened. Young professional officers have been given command appointments and those who took part in the coup or were in any way engaged in politics have been removed. The Afghan Army is now doing most of the fighting while the Russians are mainly confining themselves to providing Air and Artillery support. The present strength of the Afghan Army is claimed to be 70,000 although the actual figure may be much lower.



The growing impression is that the Afghan regime will survive and there are no particular signs of its downfall. Time is certainly on its side. There are no signs of the resistance becoming united to form some sort of organisation and there are divisions among the groups. At present the threat from the resistance is being contained at a manageable level.

The regime in Kabul will take a long time to consolidate its control over the whole of Afghanistan. It has begun to win resistance pockets around the country.

Today, the regime in Kabul is well placed to win without making major diplomatic or political concessions to Pakistan as it may have done in 1982 or even in 1983.

[5 Sep 84 p 4]

[Text] The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan are estimated at about 3 million and their ranks are being swelled as more and more Afghans continue to flee their country. It is therefore difficult to determine their exact number. Many of them leave their camps in search of employment in various parts of Pakistan and even abroad.

Almost all the refugee camps are in NWFP and Baluchistan, the maximum congestion being in the Tribal area of the Frontier Province where the number of refugees equals the local population. In view of this an attempt was made by the government to shift some refugees to camps in the Punjab. The original plan called for moving 300,000 in the first phase. However, after shifting about 100,000 the scheme seems to have given up as Afghans do not like to live in areas away from their fellow tribesmen and because of the language difficulties.

Some Refugee camps have begun to acquire the appearance of settled villages. The tents have been replaced by traditional mud huts, similar to those left behind in Afghanistan. Some even boast of local bazars. They are obviously prepared for a long wait or even a permanent settlement.

The affluent among the refugees have bought property in Peshawar and the adjoining areas thereby causing considerable inflation and pushing the prices of available housing up. Although officially Afghan refugees cannot buy property in Pakistan, this is happening. Others, who had brought their trucks with them, have captured a fair segment of the trucking business and today it is a common sight to see Afghan trucks plying on the roads with temporary route permits.

The less affluent Afghans are also giving tough competition to their Pakistani counterparts. Afghan shopkeepers now compete with local shopkeepers. Afghan labour is in greater demand because it is regarded as hard working and demands lesser wages than local labour. This has caused a certain amount of tension between refugees and the local population. With the passage of time competition for jobs is bound to grow but it is at manageable level for the present.

In the rural areas. overgrazing by herds belonging to refugees when pastures are scarce, has created some friction. Scarcity of fuel has caused deforestation in some areas. The situation will remain under control as long as foreign assistance is forthcoming but basically it is volatile.

Notwithstanding the social and political problems that Pakistan has to face because of the influx of Afghan refugees, the economic burden has been considerably eased by the generous financial assistance from the International community. The 1983-84 budget is 441 million dollars. More than half of it comes through the United Nations. The rest of the expenditure has to be met by Pakistan. However, this financial burden is considerably reduced by the generous donations of the oil-rich Arab countries.

There is no knowing at present when the refugees will be able to go back to their country. Even after 4-1/2 years the Afghan problem is nowhere near a solution. But when the time does come, how many will be willing to go back is debatable. Those who have invested in property or business certainly will not, but their number is very small and it will not matter much. The remaining majority belong to the rural areas and are mostly sedentary farmers. Because of the scarcity of arable land in Afghanistan they were eking out a precarious existence when they migrated to Pakistan. Now, according to the reports, the lands belonging to Afghan refugees are being distributed to tribes in Afghanistan who are cooperating with the present Afghan regime. Migrating farmers thus deprived of their lands will have little incentive to go back. With the passage of time, the prospect of most of them returning to their ancestral lands are bleak. Even if an agreement is reached and the deadlock resolved, the present political situation in Afghanistan is unlikely to change. There would still be a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. Sadly, the plight of Afghan refugees is going to be no different than what has been the fate of refugees in other parts of the world in recent years.

#### Political Settlement

The first attempt by Pakistan to resolve the Afghan problem created by the Russian intervention in that country took place in June 1980 at MT Pelerin in Switzerland under the aegis of the Organisation of the Islamic Countries. The standing committee appointed by the O.I.C. comprised Secretary General of the O.I.C. Mr Habib Chatty, Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr Sadigh Qotebzadeh and Mr Agha Shahi. They were to have talks with leaders of the resistance group based in Peshawar, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The talks were held but no results could be achieved as both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan refused to participate in the talks. Soon after Iran, too, disassociated itself from the standing committee of the O.I.C.

It was realised by Pakistan that if the talks were to continue they will have to be held under the aegis of United Nations. Accordingly, a request was made to the United Nations Secretary General who, after a debate in the UN General Assembly in which 116 countries voted for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, 23 voted against with 13 abstentions appointed a UN representative to supervise the talks.

Only Pakistan and Afghanistan participated in the talks. Iran was invited but refused to take part because Afghan resistance groups were not included in the parleys. The talks were indirect because Pakistan does not directly talk with the Afghan regime as this would imply its recognition under Babrak Karmal. The UN Representative shuttled between the parties.

So far there have been three rounds of indirect talks at Geneva between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The first in June, 1982, second in April, 1983 and in June, 1983 and the third in August 1984. Nothing substantial has been achieved. Only a loose agreement exists between the parties concerned which is more or less in line with the four guidelines provided by the UN General Assembly.

The four point formula has undergone slight changes of tone and wording as well as content. At present it is as follows:-

- a. Withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.
- b. Non intervention by foreign troops both in Afghanistan and Pakistan coupled with non-interference (cessation of outside aid to the resistance groups)
- c. International guarantee for Part (b) (probably by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council or the Super Powers)
- d. Honourable repatriation of the Afghan refugees, with the right to choose their own but non aligned form of government.

Whilst both Pakistan and Afghanistan agree to the above formula, the talks have bogged down because Pakistan insists on a time table for the withdrawal of Russian troops whereas Afghanistan insists on cessation of continued interference in its internal affairs and of outside help to resistance groups.

Such talks are not likely to be successful unless these are direct between Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and the United States. The situation will only be resolved when the Soviet Union agrees to withdraw its troops and both Pakistan and the United States, preferably along with remaining three permanent members of the UN Security Council, provide a guarantee of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan by themselves can impose an accord unless it is agreed to by the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is unfortunate that behind the facade of pious proclamations, self righteous statements and adherence to lofty principles, Afghan crisis has been allowed to fester for political and financial gains. Afghanistan remained a non-aligned country from 1919, when the British intervened militarily for the last time in Afghanistan. What were the reasons which brought about a coup in 1978 and the Russian military intervention in 1979. The Soviet Union has certainly a part in this sordid drama and must be condemned but they are not the only ones. It was the Shah of Iran's

attempt to change the non-aligned status of Afghanistan which led to a revolt that was in the first place political but had strong nationalist and potentially social consequence.

The people of Afghanistan deserve the sympathy of all right minded people as their misfortunes date back to several centuries. First, they were not allowed to come out of the medieval ages on account of the exploitation by the Kings and the Knaves, which is evident from their lack of development in almost every field: social, economic and political. Now they are groaning under the heels of a foreign military boot. One hopes that one day the valiant people of Afghanistan will be allowed to be the final arbiters of their destiny.

CSO: 4600/769

GOVERNMENT USE OF MEDIA TO INFORM PUBLIC DISCUSSED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 6 Sep 84 pp 1, 11

[Interview with veteran journalist Z. A. Suleri, advisor to President Zia, by Waris Mir and Arif Nizami; date and place not specified]

[Text] Waris Mir: Mr Suleri, you have broad and first-hand knowledge of Pakistan's internal and external problems. Pakistan is at present confronted with the greatest dangers in its history. On one side we find Russia in Afghanistan, killing people on our border. Then there are Indian troops at Kashmir and other borders that link us to India. We have heard of some skirmishes, too. It is the policy of Indira Gandhi, prime minister of India, to throw the responsibility for her country's internal problems on Pakistan. Events of the past make us fear that anything may happen now. Of course, we do not want to frighten people, still it is necessary to tell the truth and prepare them to face the future. Please tell us if there are real dangers on our borders and then explain to us whose duty it is to inform the people and keep them abreast of the latest situation in the land.

Z. A. Suleri: An independent homeland is the most important thing. You can have the political system of your own liking only in an independent country. Look at the millions of Muslims in India. They cannot talk about an Islamic state because they have no independent state of their own. They are like powerless shadows and mere corpses in that country. Nobody talks about them at the international level. Likewise, there are millions of Muslims in the Soviet Union, but they have sunk to the level of a nonentity. You can talk about a political system only when you have a country. The political system has a secondary place; the primary thing is to have a strong country. Two things are imperative for making a country strong. First we must have arms and ammunition enough to protect our country in case of an external attack, and second we must have very high morale. If we have both of these requisites, no enemy will dare to attack us. Every country has its own particular situation. We are, as you said, surrounded by dangers. Now the question is do we possess the two things necessary for our protection? It is a fact that we are surrounded by the Indian Army and the activity of that army is directed against us. Then there is Russia, which always moves slowly, but the speed and direction of its present movement spells danger for us. We have not yet grasped how dangerous Russia can be to us.

Wari Mir: Why are we insensitive to this danger?



Suleri: I am coming to that point. The fact is that we know the danger but lack the initiative to fight against it. We are lethargic and careless.

Ari Nizami: Why are we insensitive? The danger from Russia and India is quite apparent. We get news of what is happening on our borders. We have seen the result of being friendly with America. Yet our people are careless. Is there something wrong with our internal policy?

Zuleri: Every government has a policy, and that policy has many implications. For instance, take America. Now America is not a reliable friend. Even if it shows friendship toward us, internally its Jewish lobby will keep working against us. They do not let us develop our nuclear energy program. Even when we get weapons from America, there is an outcry that we might use them against India. Our relationship with India is another constant problem. It is the duty of the rulers to keep the public informed of the dangers around them. They have all the information and they decide how much of it should go to the media and so to the public. They decide to what extent the people should be made sensitive to the political situation.

Waris Mir: It is the government's duty to keep people informed about all dangers so that they can be alert to them. Again, every government has to decide about priorities. Now that the danger of war looms high on our borders, is it not the first duty of the army to focus on its true role of defending the country? Would it not be better for the army to limit itself to that all-important work rather than scatter its energies in two different directions--defense and politics? The government should keep the public well informed in all matters.

Suleri: I have said before that the policy of the government is too restricted on this point. They should release all information to the newspapers and in this way prepare the people for any situation that may arise.

Waris Mir: My point is: Should the army not act upon a formula for the rapid transfer of power and free itself for the job of defending the country at once? How would you determine the priorities in such a case?

Suleri: I think the problems will remain as they are, whether there is a democratic government or the present. I do not think a change of government will make any difference. I think the first priority just now is defense and the present government is quite capable of handling this task. I think the emotion-packed speeches of the previous rulers did not help in the defense of the homeland. Those rulers were very excitable and hasty, and they did us no good. The greatest merit of our present ruler is that he is never carried away by his emotions. He makes every decision with cool consideration and patience. Still, I think the present situation is so fraught with danger that the public should be fully informed.

Arif Nizami: You have talked about the role of the present regime and mentioned its priorities. But the question remains. Are these priorities correct? What do you think should be order of priorities in our country?

Suleri: You are right. The greatest hurdle in the way of our progress has been that we never had any clear idea about the order of our priorities. We made Pakistan but failed to make Pakistanis a nation. The Pakistan Movement was based on the idea that Muslims are one nation, quite different from the Hindus. When Pakistan was created we should have consolidated Pakistan as the home of one nation. We should have tried to Islamize the country from the very beginning. Still, protection of the country comes before Islamizing it.

Arif Nizami: How can we best protect the country?

Suleri: I think there are some hurdles in the way of our becoming one united nation. Chief among them is the federal system of government. Some countries (the United States is one of them) have made federalism a success, but I think a centralized form of government would serve our purpose better. After the creation of Pakistan we forgot Pakistan and began to talk about regions.... Federalism has some special implications. It means that different regions have given some powers to the center and promised to adhere to it. We stressed Islam but did not stress one nation. That is why East Pakistan left us. Even now, when Pakistan is shown on the map, it is not depicted as one nation but as four regions. How can we have unity and integrity if we do not feel we are one nation? How can we develop nationalism?

Waris Mir: Suleri Sahib, now let's talk about the immediate dangers that threaten us. One of our enemies is India, which has never been decent to us. It has a regular military pact with the Soviets. Pakistan has no such pact with another country. An economic assistance pact is something quite different. Do you think Pakistan should make a similar pact with a superpower?

Suleri: It depends on the gravity of the situation. If you think the danger is great, we should make such a pact or we shall suffer as a consequence. My point is that we should not waste time in general debate. We should keep our country in view and work for its progress.

Waris Mir: Suppose our country is in danger, would you agree that we should make a military pact with a superpower?

Suleri: I would agree with any step that advances the defense of the country.

Waris Mir: Under present circumstances, should we draw closer to the United States and let the status quo persist?

Suleri: If drawing closer to the United States can help us in our defense programs, there is no harm in doing so.

Waris Mir: Suppose America demands military bases?

Suleri: To answer this question I would have to discuss military strategy of which I have not sufficient knowledge.

Waris Mir: Will it help our defense policy if we draw closer to China? Would it be useful to include China in any defense pact?

Suleri: We have good relations with the PRC, and drawing closer to it will not hurt our relations with the United States, because it, too, is now friendly with China.

Waris Mir: Our relations with China will be lasting, but how long do you think our relations with the United States will last? I ask this because America is a democracy, and we are gradually drifting away from their way of life. If there are ideological differences between two countries, their relations are sure to be affected.

Suleri: No country considers the form of government when making friends with another country. In my youth, we were not as friendly with the West as we are now, and I do not think we are breaking away from the Americas on the social level. Also, countries make friends with each other for several different purposes; some connections result from particular conditions.

Waris Mir: Let me explain myself. I only mentioned the United States, but I wanted to talk about Russia and China, too. The Iranian revolution has caused quite a bit of discussion among Muslim nations. It is said that apart from religion, a socialist society is closer to the teachings of Islam than other forms of society. The United States had democracy, which has failed in our country. What do you think about that?

Suleri: Some Islamic countries are moving closer to the Soviets, not because of their ideology but simply because the United States is with Israel and Muslims, for that very reason, are moving away from America. This is an objective reality.

Waris Mir: If the president is change in the United States, their foreign policy will also change. The friendship between India and the Soviets is becoming stronger every day. Suppose we give the United States bases in our country and then their government changes, will the cooperation between our two countries continue? Will Pakistan not suffer because of the change?

Suleri: If I had to decide about giving military bases to the United States I would decide after studying the results of the short-term and long-term programs. At present I can say nothing. The greatest hurdle in the way of our friendship with the United States is Israel, since we cannot leave the Arabs. Friendship with the United States is like walking on slippery ground, but we should not give it up. We should keep our friendship with America without doing anything harmful to Pakistan. In international relationships you have to maintain a balance between benefits and losses.

Arif Nizami: Even if we give bases to America, the problem of India will remain. We are in danger from both India and Afghanistan. Is there any solution to this problem?

Suleri: India is a big country. The United States will never leave it for our sake. If there is turmoil in the subcontinent, it can influence the policies of other countries. Hence both the United States and the Soviets are more concerned about the safety of India than they are about our safety.

Arif Nizami: A plan for a nonaggression pact between India and Pakistan was begun and went through many ups and downs. Once it was thought that the pact was ready for signature, but then everything came to an end. What causes so much trouble between India and Pakistan?

Suleri: We are given to wishful thinking, while India is always trying to find fault with us. Even our good wishes are suspicious in its eyes. Expecting things to be settled quickly is self-deception on our part. I think India is an ever-present threat, not only to us but also to our younger generation.

Waris Mir: Why could we never convince the Western media of our point of view, especially regarding our atomic energy program? I have seen the same attitude toward us in all of the Western media. What do you think is the cause of it?

Suleri: The International Atomic Energy Agency has never shown any prejudice against us. But it is the policy of the Western powers to keep us in a dependent posture.

Waris Mir: When a nation feels insecure it is generally the result of an internal sense of insecurity. Do you agree if I say that all the defects of the martial law government are slowly becoming a part of our national character? Do you think the sense of isolation that our nation feels has been created by the regime?

Suleri: In a political regime there should have been more hue and cry.

Waris Mir: If anything happens in India, people there can make a noise against it. Even the BBC has been impressed by their campaigns.

Arif Nizami: When the question of Khalistan arose, some people shouted slogans against it. There was an uproar against it at the national level. Indira Gandhi and her policies have been denounced in public. That is how bad government policies are corrected.

Suleri: I think our government has not taken people into its confidence in certain matters.

Waris Mir: If the government has not done its duty how can the newspapers do their duty in this connection?

Suleri: The government should provide more information to the media and the newspapers concerning the defense policies. The government should explain things to the newspapers, and the newspapers should convey it to the people in their own way.

Waris Mir: The government newspapers get their news from the regime. But there are some independent newspapers as well. Will you please advise the government to make some use of their credibility.

Suleri: I think newspapers should not be divided into government and nongovernment. The real purpose is to convey information to the public through them. I think discussions on military topics should be arranged, and military men should be invited to explain things to the public.



Waris Mir: Retired military men cannot know anything about the latest military activities in the land and active-duty men will not make any revelations in public.

Suleri: If defense of the country is given priority, communication can be arranged.

NAWA-I-WAQT: Our federal defense minister, Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur says that no power on earth can harm Pakistan. How can we believe that?

Suleri: Only he can tell us what makes him say that. How can we be so complacent in the face of India and the Soviets having such large fighting forces.

Waris Mir: There is a distance between the various political leaders and the government, or we might say between the government and the public. Now that the country is in the midst of grave dangers, do you not think this estrangement should end and the public brought closer to the government?

Suleri: I think there should be more communication between the government and the public and other agencies.

Arif Nizami: We were talking about Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur's statement. We have heard such words so often that they have lost all credibility.

Suleri: I am worried about this state of things. Our nation lacks the will and determination to defend itself. Another thing I want to say about the media is that we are unnecessarily sensitive about news of crime. Such news should not be banned. It is a part of our life. How can we reform our society if we do not know what is happening? In the same way, people should be informed of what is happening at our borders.

Waris Mir: The gist of today's discussion is that it is the foremost duty of the government to inform the public about the dangers surrounding our country. The government should use the media to get in touch with the public. There should be communication between the public and the politicians and among the people of different regions. In this way the public will learn to be prepared to face the external danger. I agree with you when you say that it is the first duty of the government to inspire the public to become prepared to defend the homeland against every external threat.

12476

CSO: 4656/209



## BRIEFS

RESTRICTIONS ON REFUGEES--Hyderabad, Sept 2--Strict orders have been issued by the Sind government to all district officers of the National Identity Cards Department not to issue national identity cards to Afghan refugees settled in Sind. The registration departments have also been directed not to register sale deeds on properties purchased by Afghan refugees. According to a government source, about five lakh Afghan refugees have settled in Karachi and other district headquarters and towns of Sind, and they have purchased immovable properties worth several of crores of rupee. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Sep 84 p 6]

JOURNALIST'S WIFE APPEALS--Karachi, Sept 3--Mrs Kusoom Sangi, wife of the detained journalist Sohail Sangi, has appealed to the Governor of Sind and the relevant martial law authorities for the release of her husband who has been in jail for more than four years. In a statement released to the press here yesterday, she said Sohail Sangi was arrested on July 31, 1980 and tried by a special military court. She said according to news published in newspapers, Mr Sangi was acquitted by the court of all the charges, but instead of being released he was detained for 90 days beginning on July 9 this year. She appealed to the Governor in the name of humanity to release her husband without further delay, saying he was the only bread winner for her and her four children. She added that due to his long confinement, her husband been taken ill, and at present was under treatment in the neurology ward of the civil hospital. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 4 Sep 84 p 6]

OIL PRODUCTION INCREASE--Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources Dr Mohammad Asad Khan has said that the target for oil production in the sixth plan has been achieved 4 years early. He said that 20,000 barrels per day are being extracted, with the figure expected to rise once new oil wells, which are hoped to be completed in 6 months, begin production. He said new technology is being used to extract oil from lower stratas. In addition, efforts are being made to locate new deposits of oil and gas. Last year, seven new reserves were discovered, five of which were oil. [Summary] [GF281156 Rawalpindi HAIDAR in Urdu 18 Sep 84 p 9 GF]

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